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Hume’s Argument Against The Existence
Of "God" Based On The Existence of Evil
by
William Fuller
This paper assumes at least superfical knowledge
of David Hume's "The Dialoguges Concerning Natural Religion."
Specfically, this paper was written as a summary of Humes argument in chapter
10 of the previously mentioned book. I would like to thank Dr. Gregory
Brown of the University of Houston Philosphy department for introducing
me to the world of philosphy. It was in his class that I wrote the
paper you are about read. If you have any comments concerning this
paper or any related topics please e-mail me at st7jv@jetson.uh.edu
Philo begins his argument by stating two premises: "God"
is infinitely powerful, and whatever "God" wants It gets.
Both Cleanthes and Demea accept this premise. Then Philo goes on
to say, that since "God" always gets what It wants, then "God"
must not want man to be happy because man is not happy. Furthermore,
Philo concludes that "God" cannot be merciful and benevolent
in any sense that humans understand those terms because the very definition
of those terms is to lookout for the welfare of those who are under one’s
own control. This presumably would include not allowing bad things
to happen to man and animal and would include only giving them the very
best things that God could offer (63).
Demea rebuts Philo’s argument that God cannot be infinite
and benevolent by saying that our perspective is limited to only a small
place in the universe and a small space in time. Demea says things
seem evil to us now because we do not have an understanding of the overall
plan of "God." If we did understand the plan of "God,"
then we would see that what seems to be evil now is really just a step
to some greater good. Since this "seeming evil" is a step
to a greater good, then it must not actually be evil but good. He
says that man must have faith that these things are true and that, at some
time in the future, man will understand all the mysteries of "God’s"
infinitely complex plan, which will be revealed and all the parts will
make sense. When Demea’s argument is broken down into its essentials,
it basically confirms Philo’s argument. Demea’s is saying precisely
what Philo said, namely, that God’s mercy and benevolence are not anything
like what man considers merciful and benevolent (64).
Cleanthes violently responds to Demea’s argument.
He says that none of the things Demea says have any shred of evidence and
therefore gives Philo no reason to accept it. Cleanthes says the only thing
that Demea’s argument is good for is to establish the possibility that
apparent evil and "God’s" benevolence are reconcilable, but this
argument can never be supported by facts because of the nature of the argument.
Therefore, in reality, the truth or falsity of Demea’s argument can never
be asserted (64).
After Cleanthes criticizes Demea’s argument, he gives
his own defense against Philo’s position. He says that the only way
to refute Philo’s argument is to completely deny Philo’s conclusion.
He simply says that Philo has emphasized the bad things in the world and
de-emphasized the good things. Cleanthes says the good things in
life are more abundant than the evil things, and because of this, man is
not unhappy. So, to sum up Cleanthes’s point, since there is more
happiness than misery, man is happy, and since man is happy, then "God"
is benevolent and merciful (64-65).
For his first rebutal, Philo employs the same
logic that Cleanthes used when refuting Demea’s argument. Philo says
that Cleanthes has based his argument on statements that are completely
unsubstantiated and impossible to support by any test or observation.
He says that it is impossible to measure the amount of pain and happiness
that mankind and animals experience to determine that they have more happiness
than pain, as Cleanthes says. Therefore, says Philo, because Cleanthes
has placed his entire argument on unverifiable evidence, Cleanthes must
admit that his argument for the benevolence of "God" is correspondingly
as poor as Demea’s (65).
Next, Philo says that he will allow all the things that
Cleanthes has so far argued against because even with all that, Cleanthes
still cannot make his argument work. This is because Philo says if
"God" has infinite power, as has already been accepted, then
"God" would not allow any evil in the world. Therefore,
since there is evil, "God" must not be benevolent in the way
that humans use the word. The only way that "God" can be
benevolent, and infinitely powerful is for It to rectify these seeming
contradictions in some way that is beyond human ability to understand.
Then Philo points out that this point is exactly the same as the first
point that he made, which Cleanthes did not accept, but Cleanthes must
accept this point now if he wants to maintain that "God" is infinite
(65-66).
Finally, Philo says that he will even concede this last point to Cleanthes.
Yet, even with all these concessions that Philo has grave doubts about,
Cleanthes still has only established a simple possibility that a benevolent
and infinite "God" is compatible with pain and misery.
However, says Philo, all these concessions still leave Cleanthes infinitely
far away from proving the compatibility of these things. Philo says
that given all the unexplained elements of the universe, it would be impossible
to establish, in any observable way, the compatibility of a benevolent
God and misery. It is precisely this kind of proof that Cleanthes
needs for his argument to be supported; otherwise, the alternatives are
to just believe without reasonable evidence (like the mystics) or not believe
because there is no proof (66).
Cleanthes responds to Philo by denying Philo’s first premise, namely that
"God’s" power is infinite. By saying that "God"
is finitely perfect, Cleanthes attempts to show that "God’s"
benevolence is compatible with pain and evil. Cleanthes says that
by accepting that "God" is not infinite, it is easy to understand
how evil and benevolence coexist together. Simply stated, as much
as it is in the power of "God," It does not allow evil, but when
evil is unavoidable, then "God" does everything It can to limit
the quantity of evil. Cleanthes says that a benevolent "God"
such as this could rule the present universe (67).
Philo’s criticism of Cleanthes’s argument takes the
form of a metaphor. He uses the example of two observers from universes
outside of our own. One of the observers is told that the earth was
created by a "God" like the one Cleanthes describes. The
other observer is not told anything about what "God" is like
or even of the existence of "God." Philo uses these two
observers to represent the a priori and a posteriori positions respectively.
He makes the point that the a priori observer would not have a problem
rationalizing the inconstancies of this world and all the evil in it.
Specifically, all this observer would have to do every time he/she did
not understand something is decide it was beyond his/her comprehension
and rely on his/her prior knowledge that there is a benevolent "God"
that created this universe and that It is beyond his/her understanding.
However, the a posteriori observer, who as Philo says is like mankind,
would not be able to reconcile all the inconsistencies of the world and
evil in this way because he/she has no prior knowledge of "God."
Specifically, this observer, who also represents man, can only make judgments
based on what he/she observes, not what he/she has not observed.
Based on this, there is no evidence that "God" created anything
because the observer did not see "God" create anything and he/she
could not observe It create anything because "God" is by definition
unobservable. Therefore, there is no reason to believe in "God"
because without a priori knowledge, the only way to establish anything
is through observation, which was just shown to be impossible in the case
of "God." If they choose to believe in this intelligence
called "God," then they are only making arbitrary ad hoc hypotheses
that have no a priori or a posteriori evidence to support them, and this
hypothesis is equivalent to the reasoning of the "mystics."
Therefore, Philo says since there is no evidence of "God," and
in fact there could not be, there is no reason to accept anything about
"God," including Its existence (67-68).
Next Philo uses another metaphor of an architect who
has built an imperfect building. He says that in such a building
one would criticize the architect for any imperfection because the architect
was responsible for the design, and he/she was deficient in conceiving
the inadequacies of his/her work. Similarly, the architect of the
universe (i.e., "God") should be blamed for any short comings
of anything in the universe because It should have foreseen the future
problems that would arise in the universe. Since God did not design
the universe so that it was without these problems, It cannot be perfect,
even finitely perfect (68-69).
In the final paragraph, Philo states explicitly the
point he was illustrating in the previous three paragraphs. He says,
simply, that if the world does not exist in such a way, and it does not,
that someone would independently think that a "God" such as the
one Cleanthes believes in exists, then there is no way for an observer,
with no a priori knowledge, to infer the attributes or the existence of
this "God." Philo says it does not matter how many consistencies
one points too because they still cannot support the inference of a "God"
like Cleanthes accepts because the observable evidence does not reveal
what would be conceived as to be the result of a "God" like the
one Cleanthes ascribes to. This is because one would have to observe
God create something in order to know what kind of things are created by
"God," and this is by hypothesis impossible Therefore,
it is impossible to prove the existence of God based on a posteriori knowledge
(69).