syllabus

SYLLABUS

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY: HISTORY AND SYSTEMS

Psychology 6301

Roy Lachman, Professor of Psychology

University of Houston

Fall 2006

The purpose of the course is to provide graduate students with a metatheoretical perspectives on the science and profession of psychology as these institutions have evolved into the 21^st century. Science is the major (and perhaps the only) body of knowledge that informs psychological practice. Lectures start with a review of the major conceptual categories in science: Metatheory, paradigms, theoretical representation, observation, inference, objectivity, confirmation, reductionism, causality, explanation and more.

The objective of the course is get you to think like a literate, mature scientist. This requires the examination of central issues in the science studies: The science studies include the history, sociology and philosophy of science. The only thing certain about the future of any social institution including science is that it will change. The dynamics of change in science is covered in the assignments and lectures on paradigm theory. Changes in theory, facts, methodology is universal in all sciences. Presuppositions are the scientist's assumptions concerning the characteristics and appropriate content, objectives and methods of a field. They are a partly tacit set of intellectual commitments, that can be viewed as paradigmatic in nature, and they rationalize and guide the practice of basic and applied science. Presuppositions differ among various “subcultures” in psychology. We examine the subcultures (paradigms of behaviorism, cognitivism, etc.) and their particular conceptions of psychological knowledge resulting from their specific presuppositional commitments. Our study of metatheory also includes the structure and function of theoretical systems and the nature of mathematical representation. A main objective of the course is to supplement technical and professional training with an analysis of metatheoretical issues that are typically absent in your other courses.

GRADING

The term grade is based on 70% for the final exam and 30% for the weekly synopses and participation.
The final exam will contain materials from reading assignments and lectures.
If you are seriously ill or incapacitated, phone me (281.992.0962) or make an appointment (rlachman@uh.edu). I will arrange to provide you with personal lectures for the ones you missed.
A synopsis (described below) is required for each reading assignment. The synopses are designed to pace your readings, to make sure that you are participating, as well as guiding me in clarifying issues in the lectures. In general a well reasoned, analytic synopsis gets an “A”. A synopsis indicating minimal effort gets a minimal grade. Earn “A” in all synopses and be excused from the final exam.
To first year students: Taking 6301 and 6300 in the same semester, including final exams, might be a bad idea.

READING ASSIGTNMENTS AND SYNOPSES

Required Textbook:

DeWitt, R. (2004). Worldviews: An introduction to the history and philosophy of science. Blackwell Publishing.

Journal Articles and Chapters:

Klemke, E. D., Robert Hollinger, David Wyss Rudge, A. David Kline (1998). Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of Science. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. (do not purchase)

All of the selections from Klemke et al have been edited and simplified by the editors. Additional articles, selected from core scientific and professional journals, are in their original form.

All assigned readings (except DeWitt, 2004) are available for downloading as PDF or MHT files at:

\\VAQUERO\library\Lachman\ 6301\ Fall 2006\Class02 to Class14 If a password is required, pw=6301

There are a number of titles in the files that are no longer required.

Much of contemporary science and current professional practice is reactive and can only be understood adequately in terms of the events, historical and contemporary, that are being reacted to. The factual basis for most of my lectures are in citations in the annotated bibliography that follows the reading assignments.

There is minimum duplication between lectures and readings. Most historical content, including the 17^th century scientific revolution up to and including logical positivism, and behaviorism vs cognitivism are covered exclusively in the lectures. For articles and chapters with a high density of unknown words/concepts, use Goggle, Stanford University on-line encyclopedia, etc for clarification of concepts. With low density, look up words after reading, if at all. Learn meanings from the context.

Synopses Requirement and Format

The synopsis requirement is an analysis of each reading, a half page to a full page in size (cf. example below). For the textbook, DeWitt, one synopsis per chapter. For small or partial chapter assignments, a smaller statement is appropriate.

Synopses are due each week on Wednesday at 1PM.

Please include your name, the class# and author in the attached doc file and put your name and the assignment class# in the SUBJECT heading of the e-mail.

Below is an example of an “A” synopses. If you make an “A” in all assignments, you are exempt from the final exam.

Robert Suchting, April 21, 2006

Class #12: Hilgard and Sperry

The readings for week 12 cover paradigm shifts in psychology. Having examined the processes of how such shifts work, we can see how they apply more specifically to our field. The first article, from Hilgard, is a quick tour of the earliest schools and systems of thought in psychology. The second article takes a closer look at the recent shift from behaviorist thinking to cognitive psychology. Overview acknowledged, thus begins our second-to-last synopsis of the semester.

Article 1: The Era of Systems and Schools of Psychology: 1890-1935

Hilgard starts us out with the note that psychology has often relied on strong leaders to keep movements in the discipline going. These leaders generally take charge of a school (group of disciples or followers of a dominant person) or a system (a logical structure that unifies and makes comprehensible obtained data). A leader can take charge of one, or the other, or both.

The first paradigm discussed is Structuralism. Here, followers of this system made several modifications of Wundt’s ideas: the definition of psychology itself was redefined, for example (now thought of as a study of the facts of experience as dependent on the experiencing individual). One of the leaders of this paradigm was Titchener, who also wrote the book “Textbook of Psychology” in 1910. This book defined the focus of psychology as several things: sensation, affection, attention, perception, association, memory, imagination, action, emotion, and thought. Other key ideas here were that “science is built on nothing more than facts and logic” and that the nervous system is thought of as within psychology’s domain.

Following this, the author delves into a discussion of Functionalism. The primary leaders here were Dewey and Angell, the latter of which held open debates with Titchener. This debate is the focus of the first part of the discussion of Functionalism; Titchener’s psychology of content is contrasted with Angell’s psychology of function. The primary issue here was the question: what falls into the domain of psychology? Titchener’s view was more restrictive, while Angell thought psychology could have both aspects of a basic science and have practical usage at the same time. Angell and Moore’s experiments later on backed up Functionalist ideals when they showed that participants would adapt to practicing before a task. Another kind of Functionalism is then discussed, where Harvey Carr kept the ideals of this paradigm alive at the University of Chicago. Carr argued that there were many kinds of Functionalism. Carr also began to relate Functionalism with Associationism and also stressed rigorous laboratory experimentation. A further detour inside Functionalism discussed Thorndike’s early support of S-R psychology and Woodworth’s insistence that students focus of S-R psychology. From there, functionalism spread and interacted with S-R psychology while Structuralism faded away. Without the contrasting Structuralism, Functionalism lost its distinctiveness and another paradigm took center stage.

Behaviorism became the focal point of psychology with its emphasis on the experiment and close affiliations with physiology and biology. Behaviorism was noted to have a preoccupation with methodology and finding an appropriate one to study behavior. John Watson, one of Angell’s students, proposed methodologies that did not feature introspection; rather, he proposed the study of the conditioned reflex. It was surprising to me that behaviorism did not receive more focus here, as it seems to be exalted as one of the most important revolutions in psychology.

The next major system was that of Hormic Psychology, led here by William McDougall. He also defined psychology as the study of behavior, independent of John Watson. The central focus of this study was instinct. McDougall authored an influential book: “An Introduction to Social Psychology.” However, the book that is most important to the discussion here is “Outline of Psychology” (1923). This book rejected mechanistic and atomistic psychology, and described this psychological study as “Hormic” psychology, named after the Greek word for “impulse.” Hormic psychology was noted for its cycle of mental activity, which described three classes of psychological functions: (1) cognition (something recognized or thought about), (2) conation (striving aspect to do something about the cognition), and (3) affection (the resolution of action’s feelings). Intellect was described as part of a cognitive structure. While prominent elsewhere, Hormic Psychology never really caught on in America.

The final paradigms discussed by Hilgard get a cursory look. First up is Gestalt Psychology, which held a holistic emphasis (that is, the whole has primacy over its parts). This conceptualization rejected atomistic and reductionistic views. Kurt Lewin’s Field Theory is also discussed quickly as an offshoot of Gestalt Psychology. The final paradigm overviewed is Psychoanalysis, but it is really only given lip service at this point. Hilgard concludes his work with a short section describing the state of psychological thought in 1935, where many major systems had been defined and major contributions thereof had been identified. However, only two of these paradigms persisted: behaviorism and psychoanalysis.

Article 2: The Impact and Promise of the Cognitive Revolution

Sperry (the author here) offers up a question posed by B. F. Skinner: “Can the {snip}

Psychology 6301 Fall 2006 Reading Assignments and Synopses

Send synopses to rlachman@uh.edu (Assignments Revised 8/1/2006)

Reading assignments for Class Meetings 2, 3 and 4 are in the DeWitt text, notice that the total pages are between 43 and 52.

PSYC6301 Section 7771	Fall 2006	# of pages
Worldviews: An Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science.	Richard DeWitt (2004)
Due Week 2	Total pages	43
Intoduction	All	3
Part I: Fundamental Issues:	All
Chap 1. Worldviews	All	10
Chap 2. Truth	All	16
Chap 3. Empirical Facts and Philosophical/Conceptual "Facts"	All	6
Chap 4. Confirming and Disconfirming Evidence and Reasoning	All	8
Due Week 3	pages	47
Chap 5. The Quine-Duhem Thesis and Scientific Method	All	12
In chapters with abridgeed assignment, always read concluding remarks at the end of the chapter
Chap 6. A Philosophical Interlude: Problems and Puzzles of Induction	to p 61 Hemple's Raven Paradox	4
Chap 7. Falsifiability	All	6
Chap 8. Instrumentalism/Realism	All	6
All of the following chapters are designed to illustrate and elucidate the interaction between the following elements in physical science: • Worldviews (super-paradigms) • Philosophical and conceptual facts (Theoretical beliefs, interperations of axioms; and presuppositions or assumptions about the domain of study) • Confirming and disconfirming data (Observations and experiments) • Auxiliary hypotheses (manifest, hidden or unknown) • Instrumentalism and realism (attitudes toward a scientific theory)
Part II: The Transition from the Aristotelian Worldview to the Newtonian Worldview:
Chap 9. The Structure of the Universe on the Aristotelian Worldview	All	7
Chap 10: All, pp 92ff skip the arguments, if you understand the points made as to the reasons educated people believed in the Ptolemaic Theory
Chap 10. The Preface to Ptolemy's Almagest	See above	5
Chap 11. Astronomical Data: The Empirical Facts	All	7
Due Week 4	pages	52
Chap 12. Astronomical Data: The Philosophical/Conceptual "Facts"	All	7
Chap 13. The Ptolemaic System	Scan, if you understand the issues
Chap 14. The Copernican System	Read	12
Chap 15. The Tychonic System	Skip
Chap 16. Kepler's System	Skip
Chap 17. Galileo and the Evidence from the Telescope	Read p 164-167, scan the rest, if you understand the issues	4
Chap 18. A Summary of Problems Facing the Aristotelian Worldview	Read
Chap 19. Philosophical and Conceptual Connections in the Development of the New Science	Read	6
Chap 20. Overview of the New Science and the Newtonian Worldview	Read	5
Part III: 20th-Century Developments in Science and Worldviews:
Chap 21. The Development of the Newtonian Worldview, 1700 to 1900	Read 187-192 & Concluding remarks	8
Chap 22. The Special Theory of Relativity	p 203-205	3
Chap 23. The General Theory of Relativity	Skip
Chap 24. Introduction to Quantum Theory	Skip
Chap 25. Some Quantum Facts	Skip
Chapter 26 is optional and is written in English, not math. You might want to read it because what he says of Quantum Theory is true of all mathematical models.
Chap 26. Overview of the Mathematics of Quantum Theory	Optional
Chap 27. A Philosophical Issue: The Interpretation of Quantum Theory	Skip
Chap 28. EPR, Bell's Theorem, Aspect's Experiments, and the Locality Assumption	Skip
Chap 29. Worldviews: Concluding Thoughts	Read	7
Chapter Notes, References, and Suggested Reading	Scan

	Science, pseudoscience and demarcation
Class meeting 05	In Klemke et al: Popper, K. Science: Conjectures and refutations.	10
Class meeting 05	In Klemke et al: Thagard. P. Why Astrology is a pseudoscience?	10
Class meeting 05	In Klemke et al: Kitcher, P. Believing where we cannot prove.	23

Class meeting 05:	Psychology and social science
Class meeting 05	In Klemke et al: Machlup, F. Are the social sciences really inferior? (Undergraduate teaching)	21	64

	Observation and objectivity
Class meeting 06	Kaplan, Abraham. (1964) The conduct of inquiry. San Francisco: Chandler. Chap 4, In particular, pp 131-136(top).	5
Class meeting 06	Duhem, P. (1954) The aim and structure of physical theory. Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press. Chap 4, In particular, pp. 144-147.	3
Class meeting 06	Zuriff, G. E. (1986). Precise of Behaviorism: A conceptual reconstruction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 9, 687-699.	12
Class meeting 06	Lachman, R. (1988). Behaviorism: Counterarguments are pointless. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 11, 165-168.	3

	Theory and Confirmation
Class meeting 06	In Klemke et al: Frank, P.G. The variety of reasons for the acceptance of scientific theories	11
Class meeting 06	In Klemke et al: Giere Justifying Scientific Theories	20	54
Class meeting 07	In Klemke et al: Kuhn: Theory Choice	16
Class meeting 07	In Klemke et al: Quine W.V. and Ullian, J.S. Hypothesis.	11
Class meeting 07	In Klemke et al: Toulmin Do sub-microscopic entities exist?.	4
Class meeting 07	Copi, I.M. (1960) Crucial experiments, pp 29-33. In E. H. Madden (Ed.), The structure of scientific thought. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.	4
Class meeting 07	Simon, H. A. (1990). Prediction and prescription in system modeling. Operations Research, 38, 7-13	6
Class meeting 07	Bennett, M. R. and. Hacker, P. M, S (2003). Philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Blackwell Publishing	10	51

	Explanation and Understanding
Class meeting 08	In Klemke et al: Kitcher, P. Explanatory unification	24
Class meeting 08	Kendler: H.H. (1981). Psychology: A science in conflict. New York: Oxford Univ Press. (p.100-103, 152-193).	45	69

	Paradigm theory and the New Integrated Science Studies (Phil, Hist, Soc of Science)
Class meeting 09	Lachman, R. and Lachman, J. L. A significant step forward. Contemporary Psychology. 1979, 24, 4-6.	2
Class meeting 09	Von Eckardt, B. (1993). What is cognitive science? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Introduction pp 1-11; and Appendix pp 345-378)	44
Class meeting 09	Lachman, R. (1994) Foundational issues in cognitive science: Important, erudite, and understandable. Contemporary Psychology, 39, 1092-1093.	2
Class meeting 09	Giere, Ronald N. (1993) Cognitive Models of Science.	6
Class meeting 09	Giere, Ronald N (1994)Reply.mht	3	57
	Reductionism
Class meeting 10	Thagard, P. (2002). How molecules matter to mental computation. Philosophy of Science, 69, 429-446. (Psych 6301: p429-433; Conclusions on p444.)	5
Class meeting 10	Kendler (p129-135)	7
Class meeting 10	Gold, Ian & Stoljar, Daniel. (1999). A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5): xx-xx For Psychology 6301: p. 1 to p.11 (2.4); p24-25 (5.43 to 6.2)	13
Class meeting 10	3 readings or scan/ 1 synopses Self-Organizing Systems FAQ; Decker: et al Self-Organizing Systems: A Tutorial in Complexity; Encyclopedia of self-organization The tutorial on complexity theory and the outlines of self-organizing systems may be rather dense. Since this area will significantly impact all of psychology, I would like you to get an idea of what is going on. Write one synopsis for all that material..	Explain
	The Legend: Logical Positivism and Logical Empiricism
Class meeting 10	Dupré, J. (1995) Review of Kitcher "The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions" Philosophical Review 104, 147-151	5
Class meeting 10	Kitcher, (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions. New York, Oxford University Press, Pp. viii, 421.	10	40+

	Part-2 Applications to contemporary issues in psychology; Insights from the preceding sections in the psychological literature
	Views of paradigms in psychology and metapsychology
Class meeting 11	Rakover, Sam S_ (1993) Metapsychology, Psycoloquy.mht	5
Class meeting 11	Stephen S. Ilardi and David Feldman. (2001). The cognitive neuroscience paradigm: A unifying metatheoretical framework for the science and practice of clinical psychology. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 57, 1067-1088	21
Class meeting 11	Lachman, Lachman, and Butterfield. (1979). Cognitive Psychology and Information Processing. Hillsdale, NJ: LEA. Chapter 4	25	51
To be considered	Lachman, R. (2004).Behavioral and & Brain Sciences 2004 27 (2): 294-295	In class 2
	Evolution and psychology (includes Scientific validity, explanation and reductionism):
Class meeting 12	Ketelaar, T & Ellis, B.J. (2000). Are evolutionary explanations unfalsifiable? Evolutionary psychology and the Lakatosian philosophy of science. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 1–21.	21
Class meeting 12	Ellis, B. J., & Ketelaar, T. (2000). On the natural selection of alternative models: Evaluation of explanations in Evolutionary Psychology. Rejoinder to commentaries. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 56-68. To top of p. 62 Stop ar Inclusive Fitness Theory	12
Class meeting 12	Steven Rose (1999).Precis of Lifelines: Biology, freedom, determinism. Behavioural and Brain Science 22: 871-921.	20
Class meeting 12	Rose vs Pinker.pdf (debate)	8	60
Class meeting 12 Optional	Charles Darwin Chap14 Conclusions.pdf	Classic

Class meeting 13	Final Exam

	Views of the history of psychology
Class meeting 14:	Hilgard, E.R. (1987). Psychology in America: A historical survey. New York: H.B.J. Chapter 3: The era of systems and schools. (Synopsis can be a few sentences on core ideas of each paradigm/school covered)	30
	Law and Dauber; How to use metatheory aand science.
Class meeting 14	Sanders et al. (2002). Legal perceptions of science and expert knowledge, Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 8, 139-153.	15
	Issues in metatheory and psychotherapy
Class meeting 14:	Mahrer, A.R. (2000). Philosophy of Science and the Foundations of Psychotherapy. American Psychologist, 55, 1117-1125.	8	53

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SOURCE MATERIALS FOR 6301 LECTURES

Part 1: Introduction and overview of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of science:.

Bunge, M. and Ardila, R. (1988) Philosophy of psychology. New York: Springer-

Verlag. Chap 1, 2, 4.

Bechtel, W. (1988). Philosophy of science. Hillsdale, NJ: LEA. Chap. 1 and 2.

Part 2: History of natural science and psychology.

A. Historical antecedents and intellectual precursors.

There are no required assignments in historical antecedents because I cover the central issues in my lectures. Much of contemporary science and current professional practice is reactive and can only be understood adequately in terms of the events, historical and contemporary, that are being reacted to. The factual basis for my lectures on the 17th century scientific revolutions and some of the essential attributes of the new science are based on Mason.

Mason, Stephen F. (1962) A history of the sciences. New York: Collier Books. Chapters 12, 13, 14, 15, 16: The scientific revolutions of the 16th and 17th centuries.

If you omitted a History and Systems course as an undergraduate: Read the sections on systems of psychology in a good history and systems text such as Kendler (1987) or Hilgard (1987). The systems (paradigms) that should be covered are Structuralism, Functionalism, Behaviorism, Psychoanalysis, and Gestalt. This material should be read over the next several weeks in conjunction with the regular assignments. Also read the Hilgard chapters:

Hilgard, E.R. (1987). Psychology in America: A historical survey. New York: H.B.J..

Part 3: The decline of logical positivism and its replacement by paradigm theory.

A. Logical positivism.

We cover the classical viewpoint of logical empiricism (Vienna Circle Logical Positivism) in class, none of the readings are required. If you inadvertently miss the lecture, read Ayer. The logical empiricist's position on the nature of scientific inquiry can only be understood from the broad perspective of their general doctrines. Logical positivism is not to be understood as a monolithic set of formulations. It is best characterized as a family of loosely related viewpoints and positions represented in the earlier writings of Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Hans Reichenbach, Kurt Godel, Otto Neurath, Moritz Schlick, Herbert Feigl, and others. They were strongly influenced by Albert Einstein, Bertram Russell, G.E. Moore, and L. Wittgenstein whose work possessed certain related aims and content and was frequently singled out for its kinship to the Viennese group. Their supporters in the U.S.A. included Carl Hempel, Ernest Nagel, W. V. O. Quine. The community of scientific psychology gradually became aware of this work and it became one of the most profound ideological props for Neobehaviorism. One early paper by S.S. Stevens was central in introducing logical positivism to American psychologists. The paper was very important and if you decide to read it do so only for background and perspective. The article is not to be accepted at current face value but it may help you understand the intellectual influences that formed some of the current attitudes of your professors on Neobehaviorism, verification methodology and theory.

Stevens, S. S. (1939). Operationism and logical positivism. Psychological Bulletin, 36, 221-263. Also in: Marx and Goodson

Ayer's book of readings is the best single source on logical positivism in its classical form; it contains the most important doctrinal papers of the leading positivists. The books by Frank and Reichenbach are representative of Positivistic scholarship and are technical but readable.

Ayer, A. J. (Ed.) (1959). Logical positivism. New York: The Free Press.

Frank, P. (1957). Philosophy of science. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- Hall.

Reichenbach, H. (1956). The rise of scientific philosophy. Berkeley: University of California Press.

B. The decline of the standard view.

The doctrines of logical positivism and the modified American version called logical empiricism are frequently referred to as "the standard view" in the literature. Brown documents the claim for a "Kuhnian" type of revolution in philosophy of science that replaced the standard view. Brown's book contains a superb account of the attributes and decline of positivism and its replacement by paradigm theory. If you are able to squeeze in the four chapters from Brown, you might find them quite rewarding.

Brown, H. I. (1979). Perception, theory, and commitment: The new philosophy of science. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Chaps. 1, 5, 7,8.

The standard view faltered on a number of problems: An issue of considerable importance was the possibility of establishing a theory-free and presupposition-free "objective" observational set of facts or data base. This is referred to, in some contexts, as the categorical dichotomy between theoretical and observational terms. The position that is now generally accepted is that scientific observation cannot be completely separated from analysis and presupposition. A second critical issue concerned the possibility of crucial experiments or any other methodological device that would, once and for all, establish the truth of scientific theories and laws.

Kaplan, Abraham. (1964). The conduct of inquiry. San Francisco: Chandler.

Chapter 3, pp 84-125. Chap 4, In particular, pp. 131-136(top)

Duhem, Pierre, The aim and structure of physical theory. Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954.

Part II, Chapter 5. Physical law, pp. 165-179,

Chap 4, In particular, pp. 144-147.

The next two papers are recent efforts to develop the theory of observation in science and to reformulate the observation - theory distinction on more principled grounds. If you wish to know the direction this issue is taking read the next two papers.

Shapere, D. (1982). The concept of observation in science and philosophy. Philosophy of Science, 49, 485-527. (Scan the example in section II, read I, III, and IV)

Fodor, J.A. (1984). Observation reconsidered. Philosophy of Science, 51, 23- 43.

The brief paper by Copi makes a very important point that you may have missed in the Duhem chapter above. Copi, in less than four pages destroys the doctrine of crucial experiments. The conclusion has to be that most scientific knowledge is fallible.

Copi, I.M. A. (1960). Crucial experiments, pp 29-33. In E. H. Madden (Ed.), The structure of scientific thought. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co.

Part 4: PARADIGM THEORY

A. Views of scientific presuppositional systems appearing about the same time as Kuhn's classic book.

Polanyi, Michael. A. (1964). Personal knowledge. New York: Harper.

See especially: pp. 160-171, 104 ff., 286-298, 299 ff. (Harper Torchback edition, 1964)

Toulmin, Stephen. A. (1963). Foresight and understanding. New York: Harper and Row. Especially Chapter 6.

B. Paradigms, normal science, and paradigm shifts.

T. S. Kuhn: Kuhn's original views on scientific progression held that a discipline starts in a preparadigmatic state with several different schools or orientations in conflict. One of the schools becomes the dominant paradigm of the field ushering in a period of normal science. Anomalies and failures give rise to a series crises. When conditions are right a new challenging paradigm arises with a resulting clash between the dominant and rising paradigm. If the ensuing revolution is successful, the new paradigm becomes dominant.

Look for and read the general principles, scan illustrations and historical examples. Don't forget to examine the Postscript, dated 1969.

Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [Scan]

You must consider that many of the specific details of Kuhn's original analysis are incorrect. He presented major changes and qualifications in the postscript to the second edition. However, his book is a classic and his emphasis on the centrality of paradigms is of major importance. In this context, I mean by paradigm: A scientific community with a common technical language, similar research problems and methods, a common data base, and a common view of reality as it is reflected in and reflects the subject matter. All of these commonalties are partial and reflect central tendencies. A "paradigm" does not mean the dominance of an area by a single substantive scientific theory nor an ideological or metaphysical comprehensive world view ().

C. Scientific paradigms--evolving conceptions of what they are, how they work, and in what ways they differ from related things.

Lakatos, I., and Musgrave, A. (1970). Criticism and the growth of knowledge. London: Cambridge University Press.

Barker, P. and Gholson, B. (1984). The history of psychology as a rational process: Lakatos versus Kuhn. In Reese, H. (Ed.). Advances in child development and behavior. New York: Academic Press.

Beilin, H. (1984). Functionalist and structuralist research programs in developmental psychology: Incommensurability or synthesis. In Reese, H. (Ed.). Advances in child development and behavior. New York: Academic Press.

Palermo, D. S. In defense of Kuhn: A discussion of his detractors. In Reese, H. (Ed.). Advances in child development and behavior. New York: Academic Pr.

I will cover Lakatos and Musgrave in class. The Lakatos chapter is frequently cited but some students have found that the effort to read it is oppressive and too time consuming.

Kuhn, pp. 1-22: Logic of discovery or psychology of research?

Masterman, pp. 59-90. The nature of a paradigm.

Lakatos, pp. 91-196. Falsification and the methodology of science research programs.

Kuhn, pp. 231-278. Reflections on my critics.

In the very extensive debate concerning Kuhn's conceptions, several additional views should be examined or at least noted. Shapere presents a strong critique of the paradigm concept but offers no viable alternatives for dealing with the reality it represents. Scheffler totally rejects the major segments of Kuhn's view including most attributes of scientific revolutions and normal science. Kordig, in contrast, steers a middle course between standard views of scientific change (i.e., logical empiricism) and the Kuhnian account of conceptual revolutions in science. Stegmuller and Brown have both made significant extensions and improvements of the Kuhnian doctrine. Lachman et. al. show in Chap. 1 and 4 how a modified and reformulated version of the doctrine can be meaningfully applied to psychology. The Brown and Lachman et. al. books are of particular interest because they accept and analyze gradual change and continuity while still using the doctrine of revolutionary change. In their view, paradigmatic change is not absolute but includes continuities and evolutionary changes. Some of the lecture material on Kuhn can be found in Chap. 1 (L.L.B).

Shapere, D. (1971). Critique of the paradigm concept. Science, 172, 706-709.

Scheffler, I. (1972). Vision and revolution: A postscript on Kuhn. Philosophy of Science, 39, 366-374.

Kordig, C. R. (1971). The justification of scientific change, Dordrect: D. Reidel,. (Short Version) Kordig, C. R. The comparability of scientific theories. Philosophy of Science, 1971, 38, 467-485.

Stegmuller, W. (1976) The structure and dynamics of theories. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Brown, H. I. (1976). Perception, theory, and commitment: The new philosophy of science. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

Kuhn, T. S. (1977). The essential tension. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

Preface IX-XXII.

Chap. 12, Second thoughts on paradigms.

Chap. 13, Objectivity, value judgment, and theory choice.

Lachman, R. and Lachman, J. L. (1979). A significant step forward. Contemporary Psychology. 1979, 24, 4-6.

Part 5: 1965-1970 PARADIGM SHIFT

A. Anomalies.

Segal, E. M. and Lachman, R. (1972). Complex behavior or higher mental process: Is there a paradigm shift? American Psychologist, 27, 46-55.

Weimer, W. B., and Palermo, D. S. (1973). Paradigms and normal science in psychology Science Studies, 3, 211-244.

Lachman, Lachman, and Butterfield.(1979). Cognitive Psychology and Information Processing. LEA. Chapters 1, 4, 14.

Evolutionary presuppositions:

Lachman, J. L. and Lachman, R. (1979).Theories of memory organization and human evolution. In C.R. Puff (Ed.), Memory organization and structure. New York: Academic Press. (pp. 133-188)

B. Criticisms of contemporary psychological practices.

Koch's criticism of Hull was one of the forces that helped produce the paradigm shift in psychology from Behaviorism to Cognitive Psychology. However, Koch now finds similar faults with all of psychology including cognitive psychology. Here we first look at some of the more analytic criticisms of psychological theory and practice, several of the papers are quite trenchant. Keep these articles in perspective: many psychological discoveries will be made in the years to come. So, in the 1980s, after roughly 300 years of natural science and a century of scientific psychology, the last word has hardly been spoken about how to best discover the properties of what is probably the most complex system in the universe, Homo Sapiens.

Koch, S. (1973). Theory and experiment in psychology. Social Research, 691-707.

Koch, S. (1974). Psychology as a science. In S. C. Brown (Ed.), Philosophy of psychology. Harper and Row.

Koch, S. (1981). The nature and limits of psychological knowledge. American Psychologist, 36, 257-269. Also in:

Koch, S. and Leary, D.E.(1985) A century of psychology as science. New York: McGraw-Hill.

The papers above show considerable overlap, so reading the any article paper should help you get a handle on Koch's thinking which is nihilistic and devastating, but includes many valid points. Read the review below to put Koch's views into a more appropriate perspective.

Lachman, R. and Mistler-Lachman, J. L. (1976). The scientists' viability. Contemporary Psychology, 21, 109-110.

B. Balanced criticism.

Weimer is very tough reading but I think his view of deficiencies in the field is much more balanced than Koch's. If you want to try this book, it will require a heavy investment of time .

Weimer, W. B. (1979). Notes on the methodology of scientific research. Hillsdale, N. J.: LEA.

There are few articles that propose real solutions to the problem of the discipline's disunity and related difficulties. You might want to look at Staats, read Bevan.

Bevin, W. (1982). A sermon of sorts in three plus parts. American Psychologist, 37, 1303-1322.

Staats, A. W. (1981). Paradigmatic behaviorism, unified theory, unified theory construction methods, and the zeitgeist of separatism. American Psychologist, 136, 239-256.

Part 6: AFTERMATH OF THE PARADIGM SHIFT

A. Learning Theory.

Learning theory was central to the dominant paradigm of 1940-1970. If learning theory is important to your professional goals, read the entire Johnston paper. One question to consider: Are the developments in biological boundaries theory and ecological learning advances in normal science or potentially revolutionary?

Johnston, T. D.(1981). Contrasting approaches to a theory of learning. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 125-173.

Read pages 125 to top of 133

Lachman, J. L. and Lachman, R. (1981). General process theory, ecology, and animal-human continuity: A cognitive perspective. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 149-150.

B. Two Noble prizes.

Here are some more results of the 1970s paradigm shift: Sperry's Nobel prize lectures and our review of Simon's Nobel prize work.

Sperry, R. (1982). Some effects of disconnecting the cerebral hemispheres. Science, 217, 1223-1226.

Lachman, R. and Lachman, J. L.(1981). Thinking at its best. Contemporary Psychology, 1981b, 26, 179-180.

C. Paradigms and presuppositions.

The following assignment is the most current publication on paradigms and presuppositions as they affect various areas of psychology. I hope you are now at point where you can read it with a self-confident but critical attitude.

Lachman, R. and Lachman, J. L. (1986). Information processing psychology: Origins and extensions. In R. E. Ingram (Ed.), Information processing approaches to psychopathology and clinical psychology. New York: Academic.

D. The human sciences.

Secord, P. (1990). The need for a radically new human science. In D. N. Robinson and L. P. Mos (Eds.), Annals of theoretical psychology, Vol. 6. New York: Plenum Press.

Polkinghorne, D. (1983). Methodology for the human sciences: Systems of Inquiry. Albany: State University of N.Y. Press. Introduction pp. 1-13.

E. Radical Behaviorism.

The following two readings are a debate on the efficacy of the presupposition of radical (Skinnerian) behaviorism.

Zuriff, G. E. (1986). Precise of Behaviorism: A conceptual reconstruction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 9, 687-699.

Lachman, R. (1988). Behaviorism: Counterarguments are pointless. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 11,

Part 7: PARADIGMS AND THEORETICAL EXPLANATION IN PSYCHOLOGY

A. Explanation.

Kendler's Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate the variety of explanations that are acceptable to various subgroups in psychology.

Kendler, H. H.(1981). Psychology: A science in conflict. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Chap 4 and 5, pp 100-216.

The next reading is strongly especially for students in the developmental program. Feldman, C. F., and Toulmin, S. E. (1975). Theoretical problems in structural psychology. In, Arnold, W. S. (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Lincoln, Nebr.: Nebraska University Press.

The following book is recommended; it covers some of the same ground as Kendler but is written by a logician. Cummins believes that the deductive- nomological model of explanation is inadequate for psychology. He argues that some of the most important phenomena of psychology can only be explained in terms of system dispositional properties (what the relevant parts of the system are and how they work together).

Cummins, R. (1983). The nature of psychological explanation. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

B. Paradigm Theory and Psychology. Several new papers have recently appeared in the literature regarding paradigm theory in psychology.

Suppe, F. Beyond Skinner and Kuhn. (1984). New Ideas in Psychology, 2, 89-104.

Weimer, W. B. (1984). Beyond Suppe in methodology. New Ideas in Psychology, 2, 115-118.

Part 7: EMERGING POSITIONS IN PSYCHOLOGY, SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Paradigm theory, in the Kuhnian version or some variation, is now the dominant theory of science. Even its most strident critics accept many of its sociological tenets and the concept of periodic revolutionary change. It would seem appropriate for research to move on to other unresolved problems in the foundations of science such as the following. What is the relationship between the often changing epistemic (knowledge) products of science and ultimate physical and psychological reality, both of which must possess certain fixed or stable parameters? How is scientific inquiry going to deal in a meaningful and effective way with complex, open systems such as those faced by psychologists? How can volitional human decision and conscious choice be incorporated into causal laws of nature or how are the latter to be reformulated? The following article and associated commentary start to address these and other issues.

Manicas, P.T. and Secord, P.F. (1983). Implications for psychology of the new philosophy of science. American Psychologist, 38, 399-413.

Comments on the Manicas and Secord paper. (1984). American Psychologist, August.

The chapter by Rom Harre also deals with a realist philosophy of science for psychology with comments on Bhaskar's approach but it is much easier to read than Manicus and Secord. -- Giere argues for a "naturalized" philosophy of science and a unified theory of science.

Harre, R. (1981). The positivist-empiricist approach and its alternative. In Reason, P. and Rowan, J. (Eds.) Human Inquiry. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Giere, R. N. (1984). Toward a unified theory of science. In Cushing, J. T., Delaney, C. F., and Gutting, G. M. Science and Reality. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. OR

Giere, R.N. (1985). Philosophy of science naturalized. Philosophy of Science, 52, 331-356.

Part 8: ANOMALIES AND REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE: CONNECTIONISM

Lachman, R. (1984). Innovative thinking about the fields of psychology. Contemporary Psychology, 933-934.

Miller, G. A. (1986). Dismembering cognition. In S. H. Hulse and B. F. Green, Jr. (Eds.) 100 years of psychological research in America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

CONNECTIONISM, AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE.

Palmer, S. (1987). A new paradigm for cognitive theory. Contemporary Psychology. 32, 925-928.

Churchland, P. M. (1990). Cognitive activity in artificial neural networks. In Osherson, D. N. and Smith, E. E. (Eds.), Thinking Vol. 3. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Churchland's chapter is the best introductory level account of Connectionism (also called PDP - parallel distributed processing).

Holyoak, K. J. A connectionist view of cognition. Science. 236, 992-996.

Schwartz, J. T. (1988). The new connectionism: Developing relationships between neuroscience and artificial intelligence. Daedalus. 123-141.

Simon, H. A. and Kaplan, C. A. (1989). Foundations of cognitive science. In Posner, M. A. (Ed.), The foundations of cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Herb Simon's chapter is the best (quasi technical) overview of Cognitive Science.

Edelman, G. M. (1992). Bright air, brilliant fire: On the matter of mind. New York: Basic Books.

PART 11: MULTIPLE PARADIGMS and FORMALISM-1: CONNECTIONIST and PRODUCTION SYSTEM MODELS; EXPERT SYSTEMS

PART 12 MULTIPLE PARADIGMS and FORMALISM-2: STOCHASTIC MODELS, REGRESSION MODELS and LATENT VARIABLE MODELS

PART 13: NONTRADITIONAL, NON-EMPIRICAL, and DECONSTRUCTIONIST APPROACHES: POST-MODERNISM

POST-MODERNISM, SCIENCE AND ANTI-SCIENCE: The following references represent the issues discussed in some of the final lectures.

Bevan, W. and Kessel, F. (1994). Plain Truths and home cooking: Thoughts on the remaking of psychology. American Psychologist, 505-509.

Holton, G. (1993). Science and anti science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Medwawar, P. B. (1990). The threat and the glory: Reflections on science and scientists. New York: Harper Collins.