Political Science 6364
Fall 2000
PGH 311
Professor Timothy Nokken
Office: 424 PGH
Office Hours Monday 3:30 – 4:30, Wednesday 10:30 – 11:30
This course is an introduction to the study of the United States Congress. Students will be introduced to a number of prominent works in the field of legislative studies. The readings in the course will introduce students to important theoretical concepts and approaches to the study of legislative politics, notably the “new institutionalism” and rational choice, and apply such theories to the empirical studies of Congress. The literature on Congress and legislative politics is vast and continues to grow. I do not claim that the readings in this course are exhaustive. Rather, they serve as a representative sample of the important debates and methodologies in the subfield today. The course also serves as an important prerequisite for comprehensive exams in the field of American political institutions.
Most basically, students are expected to attend class and to have completed the assigned readings by class time each week. I am virtually intolerant of absences in any course, let alone a graduate level course. Additionally, students are expected to participate in class discussions. It is crucial that students participate on class discussions. Doing so creates a far richer intellectual environment. Failure to participate in class will be construed as lack of preparation. In addition to that basic tenet of graduate education, students will be expected to complete the following assignments: Week one problem set, five (5) short reaction papers, a final exam, and a research paper.
Problem set: Hand out will follow.
Reaction papers: Students will submit brief (2 to 3 page) papers related to the readings for five weeks (chosen by the students). Each paper will be worth 20 points (for a total of 100 points).
Final Exam: The final exam will be a take home essay exam worth 100 points. One may think of this exercise as a “comprehensive exam lite.”
Research paper: A more detailed instruction sheet will follow, but the general format will have students investigating some aspect of congressional behavior at the individual level. Each student MUST clear their paper topic with me. Students will also be responsible for making a presentation of their papers in class, much like you would at an academic conference like APSA or Midwest. The paper will be worth 200 points.
Your final grade will be determined by the total points you accrue throughout the semester. I will use the traditional 100-90, 89-80, etc grading scale.
Books & Articles:
I have ordered the following books for this course. All are available at the University Bookstore, Amazon.com, buy.com, where ever you want to purchase them (and I strongly suggest you purchase the books!).
Binder, Sarah. Minority Rights, Majority Rule Cambridge:Cambridge Univ. Press.
Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins. Legislative Leviathan Berkeley:California
Fiorina, Morris P. 1989. Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment New Haven:Yale.
Krehbiel, Keith. Information and Legislative Processes Ann Arbor:University of Michigan.
Mayhew, David. Congress: The Electoral Connection
Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York:Oxford
Rohde, David. Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform Congress Chicago:University of Chicago
Shepsle, Kenneth and Barry Weingast, eds. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions Ann Arbor:University of Michigan.
Shepsle, Kenneth and Mark Bonchek. Analyzing Politics New York:Norton (RECOMMENDED)
Oleszek, Walter J. Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process Washington, DC: CQ Press (HIGHLY RECOMMENDED)
In addition, I will assign a number of articles throughout the semester. Many of them will be available via JSTOR – most any article from JOP, AJPS, and APSR should be available on JSTOR. If not, I should have them in my office for you to copy. You will be responsible for obtaining assigned articles not available on JSTOR (possibly from the instructor).
NOTE: I am not assigning the Oleszek book. It will serve as a general reference on procedural matters and rules in both the House and Senate.
Week 1 (Aug 21) – Where we stand. Studying Congress
Analyzing Congress, Chapter 1
Shepsle and Weingast. Foreward, Introduction, Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions Chapters.
Shepsle, Kenneth. “The Changing Textbook Congress.”
Problem Set Distributed
Week 2 (Aug 28) – The Electoral Connection – A Solid Foundation
Problem Set Due,
Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection
Fenno, Richard. 1977. “House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration.” 71:883-917. [pre-cursor to Homestyle].
Miller, Warren E. and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” APSR 57:45-56.
Recommended:
Fenno, Richard. 1978. Homestyle
Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina. 1987. The Personal Vote
Although I’d be willing to entertain a motion to hold class on Labor Day. This would actually benefit you.
Week 4 (Sept 11) – Legislative Organization – Distributive Theories & Jurisdictions
Weingast, Barry R., and William Marshall. 1988. The Industrial Organization of Congress. Journal of Political Economy 96: 132-63.
Shepsle & Weingast. 1987. “The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power” APSR 87: 85-104
Krehbiel, Shepsle, and Weingast. 1987. “Why Are Congressional Committees Powerful?” APSR 81:929-945.
King, David C. 1994. “The Nature of Congressional Committee Jurisdictions” APSR 88:48-62.
Krehbeil, 1988. “Spatial Models of Legislative Choice.” Legislative Studies Quarterly (I have a clean version you can borrow to copy).
Shepsle and Bonchek
King, David. Turf Wars
Fenno, Richard. Congressmen in Committees
Shepsle, Kenneth. 1974. The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle.
Smith, Steven and Christopher Deering. Committees in Congress
Stewart, Charles III, and Timothy J. Groseclose. 1999. "The Value of Committee Seats in the United States Senate, 1947-91." American Journal of Political Science 43 (July): 963-973.
Week 5 (Sept 18) – Informational Models of Legislative Organization
Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization
Krehbiel, Keith. 1990. “Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?” APSR. 84:149-163.
Recommended
Batista, James S. C. 1998. "Informative Committees in a Bicameral Legislature" Presented at the annual meeting of the Public Choice Society, New Orleans, LA
Gilligan and Krehbiel. 1990. “Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature.” AJPS 34:531-564.
Adler and Lapinski. 1997. “Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition: A Constituency Characteristics Approach.” AJPS 41:895-918.
Groseclose, Tim. 1994. “Testing Committee Composition Hypotheses for the U.S. Congress.” JOP 56: 440-458.
Week 6 (Sept 25) – Partisan Theories of Congressional Organization
Cox, Gary W. & Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan.
Schickler, Eric and Andrew Rich. 1997. “Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House” AJPS 41:1340-1375.
Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. “Toward a Theory of Legislative Rules Changes: Assessing Schickler and Rich's Evidence.” AJPS 41:1376-1386.
________. 1997. “Party Government in the House Reconsidered: A Response to Cox and McCubbins” AJPS 41: 1387-1394.
Cox & McCubbins “Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House.” In Shepsle and Weingast.
Week 7 (Oct.
2) – Parties and Leaders in Congress – Where’s the Party?
Rohde, David. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform Congress
Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. “Where's the Party?” BJPS 23:235-266.
Nokken, Timothy P. 2000. “Dynamics of Congressional Loyalty: Party Defection and Roll Call Behavior, 1947-1997.” LSQ
Aldrich and Rohde. 2000. “The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government.”
Jenkins, Jeffrey
A. 1999. “Examining the Bonding Effects
of Party: A Comparative Analysis of Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. and
Confederate Houses.” AJPS
Week 8 (Oct. 9) – Legislative Structure – Congressional Rules and Procedures
Binder; Sarah A. 1997. Minority Rights, Majority Rule
Polsby, Nelson. 1968. “The Institutionalization of the US House of Representatives.” APSR 62:144-68.
Dion, Douglass and John Huber. 1997. “Sense and Sensibility: The Role of Rules.”AJPS 41:945-957. [and Krehbiel Response]
________. 1996. “Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules.” JOP 58:25-53.
Smith, Steven S. 1989. “Taking it to the Floor.” In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered 4th ed. Washington, DC:CQ Press.
Young, Garry and Joseph Cooper. 1993. “Multiple Referral and the Transformation of the House Decision Making.” In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered 5th ed. Washington, DC:CQ Press.
Schickler, Eric. 2000. "Institutional Change in the House of Representatives, 1867-1998: A Test of Partisan and Ideological Power Balance Models." APSR
Recommended:
Weingast, Barry R. 1989. “Floor Behavior in the U.S. Congress: Committee Power Under the Open Rule” APSR 83:795-815.
Weingast, Barry R. “Fighting Fire w/ Fire.” In Davidson’s The Post Reform Congress.
Smith, Steven S. Call to Order
Bach, Stanley and Steven Smith. Managing Uncertainty in the House of Representatives.
Binder, Sarah A. and Steven S. Smith. 1996. Politics or Principle? Filibustering in the United States Senate. Washington, DC:Brookings.
Week 9 (Oct 16) – Roll Call Voting I
Weisberg , H. 1978. Evaluating Theories of Congressional Roll-Call Voting AJPS 22:554-577.
Asher & Weisberg. 1978. “Voting Change in Congress: Some Dynamic Perspectives on an Evolutionary Process.” AJPS 22:391-425.
Jackson and Kingdon. 1992. “Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes.” AJPS 36:805-823.
Dougan, William R. and Michael Munger. 1989. “The Rationality of Ideology.” Journal of Law and Economics 32:119-142.
Grofman, Bernard, Robert Griffin, and Gregory Berry. 1995. “House Members Who Become Senators: Learning from a ‘Natural Experiment’ in Representation.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 20:513-530.
Kalt, Joseph P. and Mark A. Zupan. 1990. “The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions.” Journal of Law and Economics. 33:103-31.
Lott, John R., Jr. and M. L. Davis. 1992. “A Critical Review and Extension of the Political Shirking Literature.” Public Choice 74:461-484.
Lott, John R., Jr. and Stephen G. Bronars. 1993. “Time Series Evidence on Shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives.” Public Choice 76:125-50.
Recommended:
My dissertation – primary because it has an extensive works cited page.
Peltzman, Sam. 1984. “Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting.” Journal of Law and Economics 27:181-210.
Week 10 (Oct 23) – Roll Call Voting II
Poole and Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting.
Poole, Keith
T. 1997. “Changing Minds? Not in
Congress!” GSIA WP#1997-22 Graduate School of Industrial
Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University.
Available at: http://k7moa.gsia.cmu.edu/\chminds\chminds2.htm
Week 11 (Oct 30) Congressional Elections – Incumbents & Challengers
Mayhew, David R. “Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals.” Polity 6:295-317.
Jacobson, Gary C. 1987. “The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in the Elections to the US House of Representatives.” AJPS 31:126-41.
Lublin, David I. 1994. "Quality, Not Quantity: Strategic Politicians in U.S. Senate Elections, 1952-1990." Journal of Politics 56: 228-41.
Jacobson, Gary C. 1989. “Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of House Elections, 1946-86.” APSR 83:773-93.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart III. 2000. “Old Voters, New Voters, and Personal Vote: Using Redistricting to Measure the Incumbency Advantage.” AJPS 44:17-34.
Recommended
Jacobson, Gary C. 1997. The Politics of Congressional Elections New York:Longman.
Herrnson, Paul S. 2000. Congressional Elections, 3rd ed. Washington, DC:CQ Press.
Bianco, William T. Trust: Representatives and Constituents.
Week 12 (Nov. 6) Congressional Elections II – Ambition and Strategy
Rohde, David, W. 1979.
“Risk Bearing and Progressive Ambition:
The Case of Members of the United States House of Representatives.” American
Journal of Political Science
23:1-26.
Black, Gordon S.
1974. “A Theory of Political
Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives.” APSR
66:144-159.
Francis, Wayne L. and Lawrence W. Kenny. 1986. “Position Shifting in Pursuit of Higher Office.” American Journal of Political Science 40:786-68.
Brady, David W. and Edward Schwartz. 1995. "Abortion Politics in the U.S. Senate" (with E. Schwartz) Public Choice 84:25-48.
Jacobson, Gary C. and Michael A. Dimock. 1994. “Checking Out: The Effects of Bank Overdrafts on the 1992 House Elections.” 38:601-624.
Groseclose, Timothy and Keith Krehbiel. 1994. “Golden Parachutes, Rubber Checks, and Strategic Retirements from the 102d House.” AJPS 38:75-99.
Week 13 (Nov
13) Campaigns & Election Outcomes (ok, money and midterms)
Brady, David W., John F. Cogan, Brian J. Gaines, and Douglas Rivers. 1996. “The Perils of Presidential Support: How the Republicans Took the House in the 1994 Midterm Elections.” Political Behavior 18, 4 (December): 345-367.
Erikson, Robert S. 1988. “The Puzzle of Midterm Loss.” The Journal of Politics 50, 4 (November): 1011-1029.
Tufte, Edward R. 1975. “Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections.” American Political Science Review 69, 3 (September): 812-826.
Campbell, Angus. 1960. “Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change.” Public Opinion Quarterly 24, 3 (Fall): 397-418.
Campbell, James E. 1987. “The Revised Theory
of Surge and Decline.” AJPS 31:965-979.
Jacobson, Gary C. 1990. “The Effects of Campaign Spending in House
Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments.”
AJPS 34:334-62.
Green, Donald Phillip and Jonathan S.
Krasno. 1990. “Rebuttal to Jacobson’s ‘New Evidence for Old Arguments.’” AJPS
34:363-72.
Damore, David F. and Thomas G. Hansford. 1999. “The Allocation of Party Controlled Campaign Funds in the House of Representatives.” Political Research Quarterly 52:371-385.
Nokken, Timothy P. 2000. “Ideological
Congruence Versus Electoral Success: Distribution of Party Organization
Contributions in Senate Elections 1990-1998.” Paper presented at the Annual
Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA.
Recommended:
Jacobson, Gary C. 1997. The Politics of Congressional Elections, 4th ed., New York:Longman
Herrnson, Paul S. 2000. Congressional Elections, 3rd ed. Washington, DC:CQ Press.
Cantor, David M. and Paul S. Herrnson. 1997. “Party Campaign Activity and Party Unity in the House of Representatives.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 22:393-415.
Leyden, Kevin M. and Stephen A. Borrelli. 1990. “Party Contributions and Party Unity: Can Loyalty Be Bought?” Western Political Quarterly 43:343-365.
Schlesinger, Joseph. 1966. Ambition and Politics Chicago:Rand McNally.
Krasno, Jonathan S. 1991. Challengers, Competition, and Reelection. New Haven:Yale University Press
Week 14 (Nov 20) Congress and the Bureaucracy
Fiorina, Morris P. 1989. Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment
Nokken, Timothy P. and Brian R. Sala. 2000. “Confirmation Dynamics: A Model of Presidential Appointments to Independent Agencies.” Journal of Theoretical Politics.
McCubbins, Mathew D. Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. “Administrative Procedures as an Instrument of Political Control.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 3:243-77.
McCarty, Nolan M. and Rose Razaghian. 1999. “Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch Appointments, 1885-1996.” AJPS 43:1122-43.
McCubbins and Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms.” AJPS 29:165-179.
Calvert, Randall L., Mark J. Moran, and Barry R. Weingast. 1984. “Congressional Influence Over Policy Making: The Case of the FTC.” In McCubbins and Sullivan, eds., Congress: Structure and Policy. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
Kieweit & McCubbins. Chapter 2, The Logic of Delegation (Handout).
Recommended:
Moe, Terry. 1984. The New Economics of Organization. AJPS
________. 1989. “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure” in Cubb and Peterson, eds., Can the Government Govern?
Hammond, Thomas H. and Jeffery S. Hill. 1993. “Deference or Preference: Explaining Senate Confirmation of Presidential Nominees to Administrative Agencies.” Journal of Theoretical Politics. 5:23-59.
Calvert, Randall L., Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. “Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion.” AJPS 33:588-611.
McNollGast. From Virginia Law Review.
Johnson, Ronald M. and Gary D. Libecap. 1994. The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy. Chicago:University of Chicago Press.
Aberbach, Joel G. and Bert A. Rockman. 1976. “Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy.” APSR 70:456-68.
Week 15 (Nov 27) Catching our Breath and Reflection:
Student Presentations
Week 16 (Dec.
4) Parting:
Presentations continued (if necessary)
Much Merriment – a formal informal gathering.