Exemplary Answer to Question 1

By Anonymous

<with notes added by instructor>

Socrates and the Apology Regarding Atheism

Socrates was accused of atheism, but he was not an atheist.

(paraphrase of Dr. Paul Saka, Ancient Philosophy lecture, February 23, 2005)

The above statement by Dr. Saka has two clauses, both of which are true—Socrates was indeed accused of not believing in the city’s gods, but he himself claimed to believe in them. If we assume that Socrates was telling the truth, then the conflict between him and Meletus, his accuser, must have been not about whether Socrates believed in the gods but rather about how Socrates saw the gods as compared to how the community saw the gods. <insightful> What seems to have been the case is that Socrates demeaned the gods in the eyes of Meletus and like-minded Athenians. As Plato does not give the case for the prosecution, we can do no more than make some inferences about how Socrates might have slighted the spiritual sensibilities of his fellow citizens. However, in Socrates’ “Apology” or presentation of his defense, there are clues as to how his view of the gods is different from the community’s.

In addressing the issue of atheism, Socrates takes care to show that he referred to divinities in his philosophical conversations. He says, “Ah, my dear Meletus, why do you say such things? Do I not at least acknowledge Sun and Moon as gods, as other men do?” Meletus replies, “No, no, Gentlemen and Judges, not when he says the Sun is a stone and the moon earth” (Plato 83). The reply is disconcerting, for the tone is sincerely distraught and gives the impression that Socrates may be misrepresenting his views somehow. Meletus may be the one who is inaccurate in his statement as Socrates retorts that it is Anaxagoras who says such things. Yet, the choice of image by Meletus suggests he feels that Socrates sees the gods as false or trivial or insignificant. It is one thing to believe in gods, another to have any respect for them.

Indeed, Socrates’ portrayal of the gods is not especially worshipful. He notes that Meletus fails to refute his assertion that he speaks of things pertaining to divinities (Plato 84). Then he poses a riddle:

On the other hand, if divinities are children of gods, some born illegitimately

of nymphs, or others of whom this is also told, who could possibly believe

that there are children of gods, but not gods? It would be as absurd as believing

that there are some children of horses and asses, namely, mules, without

believing there are horses and asses. (Plato 84)

The reference to illegitimacy of birth essentially places gods on a human moral plane. And comparing divine reproductive process with that which produces sterile mules certainly deglamorizes the divine status of gods. The jury would have had the sense that Socrates could have picked examples more flattering to their gods.

That Socrates may believe in the city’s gods but not respect them and thus not respect the people who put much stock in them is suggested by the reverence he expresses for the God he worships. Perhaps it is understood that the phrase “the God” refers to Zeus, but Socrates never refers to Zeus, only to “the God.” And this God with a capital G has a low opinion of everyone but Socrates. This God has said that no one is wiser than Socrates (Plato 78). But by this the God does not mean that others are wise and Socrates is simply a litter wiser. No, Socrates makes a point of noting that the general understanding of wisdom is flawed. He himself studied the matter and found that “those most highly esteemed for wisdom fell little short of being most deficient,” and that “others reportedly inferior were men of more discernment” (Plato 78). He learns that poets, like seers and prophets, “know nothing of the things they speak” (Plato 78). Socrates eventually came to see that “it is really the God who is wise, and by his oracle he means to say that ‘Human nature is a thing of little worth, or none” (Plato 79). Socrates is wiser only in that he knows nothing in respect to wisdom (Plato 79).

If we substitute the word “superior” for “wiser,” we can see how Socrates could have been found guilty although he did believe in God. Socrates presents himself as the instrument of God, called via oracles and dreams, to show people their philosophical errors. The community might have forgiven Socrates for doing God’s work if only he had not clearly enjoyed it so much. It probably wasn’t his superiority they resented so much as his air of superiority. It is one thing to be able to please God, it is another to enjoy pleasing God at the expense of those less gifted.

In all fairness to Socrates, once he stood accused, there was no way out with dignity. <I.F. Stone, in The Trial of Socrates, argues that Socrates could have won over the jury by appealing to Athen's liberal tradition of the freedom of speech. I should point out, however, that the Socrates of the Republic does not believe in freedom of speech.> He could have flattered the jury and told them they were all wise, but, even if they had believed him, he would have felt inauthentic. It is because he was not easily self-deceived that he could subordinate his interests to the demands of responsibility. When the Thirty Tyrants ordered him to join a party to bring back someone to be executed, he refused to go, and in that political climate, that was a risky decision (Plato 88-89). I think he really did feel humility in the face of life’s mysteries. His God was not Zeus, or at least not the Zeus who disguised himself as a spent cuckoo so that he could get close enough to his twin sister Hera to rape her (Graves 50). No, it was a more moral God, and it was a feat of moral imagination that in those pagan times Socrates could have envisioned or adopted a deity of wisdom. Democritus may have been the more brilliant philosopher—I suspect he was the better theoretician—but that doesn’t mean that he had better moral judgment. In retrospect, he does seem great in the context of a time that did not tolerate much in the way of independent moral judgment.