Madison's Theory of Constitutional Design: An Empirical Analysis.
Advisory committee: Donald S. Lutz (Chair), Robert L. Lineberry,
Ross M. Lence, and Clifford Egan.
I utilize empirical and quantitative methods to test the theory advanced by James Madison that short, framework-oriented constitutions have greater durability than long, statutory-type constitutions. The dissertation consists of a detailed analysis of the contents of the 145 constitutions used in the fifty American States since 1776. I divide constitutional content into two major categories. Those provisions which establish governmental principles, institutions, and processes I call framework provisions. The second category, particularistic provisions, consists of statutory-type provisions which are not essential to the framing of a government but have been given constitutional status. The texts of the constitutions are then coded appropriately and the effect of the different provisions on constitutional longevity is assessed through statistical means.
The data reveal that particularistic provisions actually enhance the longevity of a written constitution (measured in years from year of adoption to year of replacement) rather than reduce it. Several variations of the model are examined in attempt to rebuild Madison's widely accepted theory. In the final analysis, however, it appears that James Madison was wrong. To this end, the analysis reveals that modern political science has been incorrect in upholding the Madisonian assumption that short, framework-oriented constitutions have greater durability. To the contrary, the data indicate that greater length and statutory-type content is associated with greater constitutional longevity rather than less.
I explore the possibility that Madison underestimated the role of written constitutions in a democratic republic. I argue that since statutory-type provisions provide a more detailed expression of the peoples' "will," they increase the "utility" of a constitution, and hence its durability. I advance this theory is three parts: 1) that substantive issues have become an integral part of modern state constitutionalism; 2) that statutory-type provisions tailor solutions to these social problems to a specific people; and 3) that statutory-type provisions enhance a constitution's authority as a mechanism of conflict resolution. In sum, statutory-type provisions increase the value of a constitution, and hence reduce the likelihood that it will be replaced by another document. These findings are evaluated in terms of Thomas Jefferson's belief in a more "democratic" constitutionalism. The possibility of two "fathers" of American constitutionalism - Jefferson at the state level and Madison at the national level - is also discussed.