From Conquest to Colonization: *Indios* and Colonization Policies after Mexican Independence

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This piece examines the role of *Indios Bárbaros*, migrant Indians, and independent Indians after Mexican Independence and how their demographic and strategic positions influenced the direction and ultimate implementation of racialized immigration-cum-colonization policies during the nineteenth century. Many intellectuals argued that one of the primary reasons for dramatic U.S. economic growth and aggressive westward expansion was the arrival of European immigrants, an aspect of which Mexico also sought to capitalize on. But unlike its neighbors Mexico received few of these immigrants because of restrictive policies influenced by unsuccessful colonization schemes and three Spanish expulsions. These conclusions contradict a view in the immigration and colonization historiography that suggests these policies were implemented to “whiten” the populations like those in Argentina or Brazil. Mexico’s immigration policies emerged in large part as a way to incorporate the majority of the indigenous populace into the larger “Mexican family” but also as a way to “Mexicanize” communities outside of state control.

Este artículo examina el papel de los *Indios Bárbaros*, indios migratorios, e indios independientes después de la Independencia de México, y cómo sus posiciones demográficas y estratégicas influyeron en la dirección y la implementación de las políticas raciales en la inmigración y colonización durante el siglo diecinueve. Muchos intelectuales sostuvieron que uno de los motivos principales del rápido crecimiento económico estadounidense y su expansión agresiva hacia el Oeste era la llegada de los inmigrantes europeos, un aspecto del que México también quería capitalizar. Pero a diferencia de sus vecinos, México recibió a pocos de estos inmigrantes debido a políticas restrictivas bajo la influencia de esquemas de colonización fracasados y tres expulsiones españolas. Estas conclusiones contradicen una idea de la historiografía migratoria y de colonización que sugiere que estas políticas fueron puestas en práctica para “blanquear” las poblaciones como en Argentina o Brasil. Las políticas de inmigración de México
no sólo emergieron en gran parte como un modo de incorporar a la mayoría del pueblo indígena a la “gran familia mexicana”, sino también como un modo de “mexicanizar” a comunidades que estaban fuera del control estatal.

Key words: Colonization Laws, Immigration Policies, Indios Bárbaros, European Immigration, Intellectuals and Indians, Simon Tadeo Ortiz de Ayala, Demography, Junta Provisional Gubernativa, Juan Francisco de Azcarate, Indians and Colonization.

Palabras clave: Leyes de colonización, políticas migratorias, Indios Bárbaros, inmigración europea, intelectuales e indígenas, Simón Tadeo Ortiz de Ayala, demografía, Junta Provisional Gubernativa, Juan Francisco de Azcarate, indígenas y colonización.

Historiography

In Dipesh Chakrabarty’s pioneering study of postcolonialism and the writing of history, the author engages one of the central issues of historical writing—the question of time, temporality, and the pitfalls of a stagist history. Through his analysis of stagist history, Chakrabarty came to critique the founding statement and approach of the Subaltern Studies Collective when he noted,

It is also with a similar reference to “absences”—the “failure” of history to keep an appointment with its destiny (once again an instance of the “lazy native” shall we say)—that we announced our project of Subaltern Studies: “It is the study of this historic failure of the nation to come to its own, a failure due to the inadequacy of the bourgeoisie as well as of the working class to lead it into a decisive victory over colonialism and a bourgeois-democratic revolution of the classical nineteenth century type . . . or [of the] “new democracy” [type]—it is the study of this failure which constitutes the central problematic of the historiography of colonial India."

It is with this critique in mind that I approach the subsequent historiography in the growing literature on Mexican immigration and colonization policies. The trope of failure, as I will demonstrate, is evident in much of this literature and has a long history that now goes back half a century. As a result, subsequent narratives are tinged with a series of questions that do little to explain these policies on their own merits and in accordance with a sensitivity to their historical temporality.2


Historiographically speaking, it could be argued that the works of Moisés González Navarro make up a significant portion of colonization and immigration literature, and the approach taken by this particular author has greatly influenced subsequent studies. He was the first to describe colonization and immigration policies as “failures” in the literature. I suggest that this tendency to read Mexican history in terms of “failure,” following the words of Dipesh Chakrabarty, is to always see the figure of the “Indian” as a figure of “lack.” In the case of nineteenth-century Mexico, the Indian serves as the figure who holds back the nation’s progress. In this historiography, therefore, “there was always room in this story for characters who embodied, on behalf of the native, the theme of inadequacy or failure.”

González Navarro’s first study of colonization policies during the Porfirián period appeared in 1953 and was followed by an expanded edition in 1960, *La colonización en México, 1877–1910*. The inclusion and success of European and American immigrants in Mexico during the Porfiriato forms the dominant narrative of these two works, as González Navarro paints a glowing picture of immigration during the late nineteenth century. In these two early works, his trope of “failure” was taken up by later historians of all eras, including those who have studied Mexican colonization policies prior to 1876. González Navarro himself came to view much of Mexican history through the lens of failure, as is shown in his monumental three-volume study, *Los extranjeros en México, y los Mexicanos en el extranjero, 1821–1970*, published in 1993. In Volume One of that trilogy, to point out just one example, he divides the book into five hefty sections, three of which are entitled first, second, and third “falls”—or “failures” if you prefer.

From the beginning González Navarro quite clearly laid out his reasons for characterizing Mexican immigration policy as a failure. In the opening paragraph to *La política colonizadora del Porfiriato* (1953), González Navarro states:

> “...a nation trying to grow up, though tripping up at the same time, but also one that “fails” to “whiten” its indigenous population. See González Navarro, *Los extranjeros en Mexico, Vol. 1*, passim.
The colonies that had more success in their agricultural endeavors were precisely those (Mormons, Italians of Chipilo, Puebla, etc.) that were less mexicanized, and the colonies in which the foreigners mixed with the nationals were never prosperous enough to justify the great deal of resources expended in their creation.5

Note here that the author’s correlation between success and failure is dependent on whether colonies were more or “less mexicanized,” and not on whether the colonies survived and flourished or whether colonies did or did not continue to have “more success in their agricultural endeavours.” Hence, for the author, Mexico’s immigration policies are a “failure” because the state “failed” to “whiten” the population.

González Navarro took up the theme of failure again in La colonización en México, 1877–1910 (1960). This study, more detailed and rigorous than his first effort, likewise ends on a bitter note as “failure” is once again invoked and reinscribed into the historiography of immigration to Mexico. Here the author ends with a lament: “And this is how the grand illusion of an independent Mexico vanished until the Revolution: foreign colonization.”6 The “grand illusion” so cherished by González Navarro was that elusive prize Mexico could never possess: foreign colonization that would “whiten” the populace in the mind of this author. Indeed, González Navarro went on to say as much in Los extranjeros en México, y los Mexicanos en el extranjero, 1821–1970, when he noted that after the revolution, “one very important change is that the necessity to ‘whiten’ the Mexican populace disappears.”7 In other words, efforts to “whiten” the population no longer appeared in the record after the revolution of 1910. Though this may seem perplexing to some, policies to “whiten” the population were, in fact, never written into immigration or colonization laws, and one is left to wonder where the author obtained his information for these conclusions.

On the U.S. side of this equation, two pieces will suffice to demonstrate how the continued trope of “failure” reemerges in this body of lit-
erature. The most recent piece is that of David K. Burden, where the author employs the term “failure” four times throughout his essay, going as far as describing nineteenth-century Mexican Liberals as politically immature when he posits that “the Liberals’ faith in the benevolence of humankind seems amazingly naïve.” In like fashion, Jürgen Bucheneau echoes the thesis of Mexico’s “failure” to whiten its population by titling an entire section of his article, “The Elusive Dream of a ‘Whiter’ Mexico.” In that section, without citing any source concerning Mexican history in his footnotes, he notes that “Díaz joined his colleagues in Brazil and Argentina in viewing immigration as a way of ‘whitening’ a heavily miscegenated population.” In addition, he goes on to state erroneously that “what was curiously absent from all of these measures was a plan to assimilate foreign nationals, or at least make them into what one Porfirian thinker called the new creoles.” He also errs in observing that there was no plan for assimilation, or what the Mexicans referred to as *mexicanizar*. In fact, the vast majority of colonization contracts under the Porfiriato had requirements to “Mexicanize” the population by incorporating Mexicans from within and without, and the genealogy of these policies can be read in the 1820s. More importantly, Bucheneau regurgitates the trope of failure but with a twist. Now, instead of Mexico simply “failing” to attract Europeans during the years 1821–1973, the “small numbers” of Europeans who did come had a “great impact” on Mexican history.


10. Most contracts awarded to survey companies and colonization companies stipulated that a certain percentage of the colonists had to be Mexicans. Luis Huller was awarded a contract to colonize Las Palomas, Chihuahua, with a population that would have to be at least 60 percent Mexican, “preferably those Mexicans that reside in New Mexico, California, Arizona, and Colorado.” See contracts in México, Archivo del Senado, *Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Senadores Decimocuarto Congreso Constitucional, Primer y Segundo Períodos* (México: Imprenta de Gobierno Federal, en el ex-Arzobispado, 1889), 72; 88–87. [Hereafter cited as Archivo del Senado.]

11. Thus, Vicente Fox Quesada is Mexico’s first president with immigrant parents and Carlos Slim is the wealthiest “immigrant” in Mexico. Or, to employ Buchenau’s own compelling evidence when he cites how “immigrants and their descendants were well represented in the Díaz cabinet”: José Y. Limantour was from a Barcelonette family and Ignacio Mariscal was “married to a woman from Baltimore.” See Bucheneau, “Small Numbers, Great Impact,” 32.
What each of these studies has overlooked is not only the centrality of demography, but also the larger questions having to do with national security, sovereignty, and the negative experiences of past colonization programs.

**Nineteenth-Century Mexican Immigration Policies and Indios Bárbaros**

In the years that followed Independence from European rule and in the exuberance of defeating their one-time colonizers, the young nations of the Americas sought to throw off the yoke of colonialism while simultaneously inviting the migration and settlement of Europeans. This effort to attract European immigrants in the aftermath of American and Mexican Independence coincided with a period of global mass migrations that lasted for about a century. José Moya asserts that the movement of Europeans that began modestly after the end of the “Latin American wars of Independence gathered steam after mid-century, reached massive proportions after the 1870s, and lasted—with a pause during WWI—until the Great Depression” was unprecedented: “[N]othing resembling this massive movement had ever happened before anywhere on the planet,” and nothing similar has happened since.  

A direct correlation could also be found between the number of immigrants accepted by a particular nation and its economic production. Thus, to cite Moya once more, “It is no coincidence that the four most important receivers of European immigrants in the nineteenth century (the United States, Canada, Argentina and Brazil) also became the four most important recipients of British investment and the four fastest growing economies in the Western Hemisphere.” The link between a booming economy and European immigrants was not lost on Mexicans during the 1820s as they witnessed a vast majority of those immigrants eventually settling in the U.S., further spurring that nation to project an expansionist policy. By the time of the global Great Depression of 1929, the United States had received the vast majority of these European immigrants, whereas Mexico was only able to attract between 1 to 3 percent of the total.  

Why did Mexico receive so few immigrants while other locales became important sites for European settlements? What was problematic about Mexican immigration and colonization policies that prevented

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or impeded the migration of Europeans, particularly as compared to the policies of Brazil and Argentina? Did the ideology of Mexican colonization policy concern itself more with domestic issues to the detriment of those with an international nature? How did expulsions, foreign invasions, a large indigenous population, and thwarted colonization schemes affect subsequent colonization policy? Why did Europeans prefer the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Brazil to Mexico, and how did the Mexican government respond to these challenges?

The following essay answers these multiple questions by arguing that Mexico’s colonization policies need to be evaluated not in terms of “failure” or “success,” but rather as legal vehicles intended to encourage the incorporation of certain groups of people into the nation of Mexico and to discourage the incorporation of others.14 The official Mexican ideal of mestizaje, which articulates a painful, if invented, community of miscegenation, has conveniently overlooked the nation’s violent practices of expulsion and exclusion that ultimately contributed to a hostile environment for European settlement. Potential immigrants not only had to deal with lower wages, “administrative disorder,” and unclear guidelines regarding colonization, but also had to contend with Mexican nativism surrounding the possibility of foreign colonization, especially after 1836 and 1848. In this regard, although much of the historiography on Mexican immigration policy has been criticized for being one of “whitening,” this sort of language was never codified into law. An examination of this historiography reveals that the origins of this argument date to the post-WWII period when scholars sought to solidify the critique of the ancien regime of Porfirio Díaz by painting it as despotic, pro-American, and thus anti-Mexican.15

Intellectuals at various times in the nation’s history had called for the “whitening” of Mexico, but immigration policies that favored Europeans over Mexicans and Indians were never adopted. On the contrary, Mexican immigration policy simultaneously permitted both the settlement of Euro-Americans in Texas and the expulsion of Spaniards from Mexico. Following the U.S.-Mexican War, the 1848 decree that instituted the Department of Colonization specifically banned Euro-American colonists from immigrating to Mexico. Otherwise, settlement in Mexico was now open to the entire world. By the time the 1883 Land and Colonization Law was passed, the experience of foreign invasions and repeated episodes of filibustering along the northern frontier influenced an immigration policy that favored Mexicans in the United States over other potential migrants to Mexico. Unlike more overt attempts at “whitening,” as in the examples of Cuba, Brazil, or the Dominican Republic, Mexico’s immigration policies emerged in large part as a way to incorporate the indigenous populace into the larger “Mexican family” but also as a way to “Mexicanize” communities outside of state control.

The attorney and Asian American Studies Professor Bill Ong Hing provides a number of answers to the question of what immigration policies can tell us about national identity in his 2004 study, *Defining America Through Immigration Policy*. Contrary to what some scholars have regarded as “political rhetoric” or simply part of the intellectual history of Latin America, immigration and colonization policies are more often than not windows into a particular period that reveal the inclusionary or exclusionary desires of the intelligentsia, in particular with regard to national identity. Ong Hing points out that “immigration policies are
not simply reflections of whom we regard as potential Americans, they are vehicles for keeping out those who do not fit the image and welcoming those who do."\textsuperscript{19} The inclusion or exclusion of particular peoples via immigration and colonization policies were bureaucratized diagrams by means of which intellectuals and politicians could shape national identity in postcolonial Mexico. Mexican nationalism, as it oscillated between exclusion and inclusion, \textquotedblleft went from excluding Spaniards in the early Independence movement, to including them at Independence, to excluding them again, all in a very short lapse of time.\textquotedblright\textsuperscript{20}

Political and economic concerns were of more interest to post-Independence politicians and military officials, whose main unease was the nation’s territorial integrity and the looming threat of U.S. and European expansion into its defined borders. Indios Bárbaros of the northern frontier regions, as well as migrant Indians, came into the purview of post-Independence colonization policies that attempted, through force and coercion, to \textquotedblleft amalgamate\textquotedblright Independent Indian Nations that had been resisting certain aspects of U.S. and Mexican westernization-cum-modernization for at least three centuries. Immigration and colonization policy in Mexico after Independence, in contrast to the prevailing historiography, was not so much concerned with \textquoteleft whitening,\textquoteright as it was with incorporating Independent Indians and subsequently creating a buffer zone against U.S. and European encroachments.

**Independence and the Promise of Empire:**

*Indios and Intellectuals*

Independence in Mexico, as in most of the Latin American nations, was an historical watershed. When speaking of the transformation of Spanish American nationalism during this period, Claudio Lomnitz argues that post-Independence statehood in Spanish America \textquoteleft forced deep ideological changes, including a sharp change in who was considered a national and who a foreigner, a redefinition of the extension of fraternal bond through the idea of citizenship, and the relationship between religion and nationality and between race and nation.\textquoteright\textsuperscript{21} Thus, all persons now born in Mexico were considered equal when Iturbide’s government \textquoteleft solved

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\textsuperscript{19} Ong Hing, *Defining America Through Immigration Policy*, 2.

\textsuperscript{20} Lomnitz, *Deep México, Silent México*, 29.

\textsuperscript{21} Lomnitz, \textquoteleft Nationalism as a Practical System: Benedict Anderson’s Theory of Nationalism from the Vantage Point of Spanish America,’ Chapter 1 in *Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico*, 27.
the so-called Indian problem by ending legal proscriptions for Indians and making them citizens." 22 With the issue of citizenship theoretically resolved, Mexicans imagined themselves as independent and on the way to full-fledged participation in the larger community of nations.

During the First Constituent Congress in 1821, those behind the first effort to implement a colonization policy believed that Mexico was in an “era that will change the face of the earth . . . putting commerce at the center of the nations among us in Anáhuac as the balancing point between Europe and Asia.” 23 The authors of this document—among them some of the most important political and intellectual figures of the period—shared a vision of Mexico assuming a more prominent role in world history as the nation that would serve as the meeting point between the East and the West. 24

Reinscribing their own historical trajectory back to the so-called discovery of the New World as the gateway to the East, these men now inverted that historical moment whereby Mexico-Anáhuac was to be the meeting point between two other civilizations. In his recommendations to the first Independent government, Simón Tadeo Ortiz de Ayala made note of the fact that

The physical situation of the Mexican empire offers invaluable advantages, considered with regard to its communications and the remainder of the civilized world. Situated in an isthmus bathed by the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, the old empire of Anahuac seems destined to exercise a large influence on the political events that agitate the large nations. The government of the empire can communicate with Europe in five weeks, in six with Asia, and in three with both Americas (North and South America). 25

This perception of Mexico as an equal partner and a middleman in world history rested in part on the belief that immigrants would help facilitate, but not control, this coming prosperity. According to these same authors, European immigrants, aside from being conduits for commerce and trade, would also help to break down the “wasteful hacienda system” by increasing the country’s population and forcing the breakup of the large landholdings concentrated in the hands of the few. 26


24. Some of these intellectuals included Manuel Mier y Terán, Antonio Cumplido, Refugio de la Garza, José Gutiérrez de Lara, Juan José Espinosa de Monteros, and Lorenzo de Zavala.

25. Ortiz de Ayala, Resumen de la estadística del imperio mexicano, 53.

The confidence of postcolonial Mexican intellectuals was further fueled by the publication of Alexander Von Humboldt’s (1769–1859) studies of the continent, in which he, too, declared that the wealth of New Spain lay in its rich and abundant lands. Evidence of his influence on the intelligentsia is evident from an examination of Ortiz de Ayala’s *Resumen de la estadística del imperio mexicano, 1822*, which refers explicitly to the “wise baron.”

According to Von Humboldt’s observations, “Those who know the interior of the Spanish colonies from the vague and uncertain notions hitherto published will have some difficulty in believing that the principal sources of the Mexican riches are by no means the mines, but in agriculture which has been gradually ameliorating since the end of the last century.” True as this may have appeared to Von Humboldt, the bounty and promise of Mexico’s fertile lands were seen as the ideal locations to colonize with “energetic, industrious, and liberal-minded Europeans.”

Moreover, the intellectuals and politicians of post-Independence Mexico believed that the wealth derived from mining during the colonial period would continue to increase.

This optimism of the Mexican intelligentsia also had its roots in the colonial period, growing out of the conception of “New Spain” as the jewel of the Iberian world. It had supplied the world with great riches in the form of bullion, crucial for the rise of the cash economy, and had also contributed the food staples that would eventually bring about the “demographic revolution” in Europe. The large and ever-increasing shipments of silver to Europe and the myths of Mexico’s untapped wealth, perpetuated by the writings of Von Humboldt, further bolstered the idea that Mexico would simply have to open its doors to Europe and the teeming millions would soon come rushing in.

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28. Von Humboldt does mention earlier in his study that bullion also constituted a large source of income for Europe: “The quantity of gold and silver annually sent by the New Continent into Europe amounts to more than nine-tenths of the produce of the whole mines in the known world.” See *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain*, trans. John Black (New York: J. Riley, 1811), ci and 54.


31. “Mexican industry experienced a boom in the first quarter of the century that was followed by successive spurts of growth that registered an output of between 1801 and 1810 to over 200 million pesos, more than four times the amount for 1701–1710.”
tuals and politicians envisioned a republic composed of yeoman farmers cultivating small plots of land; inevitably they would become part of the world economy and thus hasten the economic development of the nation as a whole.

For most Mexican politicians and intellectuals, the model for parceling out lands to those willing to colonize frontier regions was based partly on their young and expanding neighbor to the north. When discussing the sheer geographical challenge that the Mexican territories represented for these post-Independence intellectuals, Ortiz de Ayala could only conclude, after calculating the size of Mexico compared to its concentrated population, that, “this proves the necessity of adopting the system of the United States, peopling the most depopulated areas with the surplus of inhabitants of some provinces.” Based on statements like this, many historians have concluded that Mexicans were quick to accept many aspects of the United States as a model for their own nation “... [because] it was evident that the ease with which the United States altered and accepted immigrants had paid off handsomely,” according to one view.

But the U.S. example would not be followed to the letter because the formulation of and ideology behind Mexico’s colonization policy, it must be recalled, reflected Mexico’s particular social and cultural milieu. Ortiz de Ayala qualifies his earlier praise of the U.S. system by stressing that Mexico should not “imitate in this part that of our neighbors.” And unlike the U.S., Mexican demography enjoyed a larger indigenous population.

In the decades prior to the wars of Independence, the population of Mexico was predominantly indigenous. Take the estimates of New Spain’s population in 1793, which two scholars of colonial Mexico offer the reader: of a population of 3.8 million, approximately 2.3 million were considered “Indian,” or around 61 percent of the total. Scholars


32. I say “partly” because Mexico appears to have had a different Indian policy than that of the United States. David Weber posits, “Throughout the Spanish American mainland by the 1790s, numerous indigenous peoples had been incorporated rather than eliminated, and most of the Natives who still lived independently along the borders of New Spain’s American empire had come to some form of accommodation with the Hispanic world, and it with them.” See Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2005), 2.

33. Ibid., 19.


35. Ortiz de Ayala, Resumen de la estadística del imperio mexicano, 1822, 85.

examining the population statistics for the years between 1810 and 1821 differ with regard to the total population but essentially find the same percentage for the indigenous population. Eric Van Young states that during this period there were approximately 6.1 million inhabitants in New Spain of which 3.7 million were Indian, or about 60 percent.  

Thus, the majority of the Mexican population was indigenous during this period and would remain so well into the nineteenth century. With a population composed primarily of indigenous peoples, the demographic reality on the ground necessarily provided the reference point for most legislation dealing with the makeup of the population following the wars for Independence. This legislation entailed, in some form or fashion, the acceptance of Mexican hegemony or the targeted extermination of indigenes by colonists and other allies of the state. These ideas shared a long trajectory going back to the colonial period and so the rupture of the Independence simply provided a space to settle those unresolved issues. Indeed, Weber argues that during the Age of Enlightenment, Spaniards “sought to promote Spanish progress through reason” and “enlightened Spanish officials debated the status of the Crown’s impoverished Indian vassals.”

Other historians of Mexico have argued along these same lines, and the noted historian William B. Taylor believes that “the Post Independence period brought massive impersonal changes to peasant life, comparable in scale to the sixteenth-century political revolutions, epidemics, resettlement programs, religious conversion, and labor and tax systems that resulted from Spanish colonization.” Laws enacted to eliminate the communal property holding of indigenous peoples “opened the way to the alienation of village lands.” Moreover, “the process of dismemberment began in the late 1820s and reached its peak . . . when the Liberals attempted to integrate Indians into national society by dissolving their communal life.” Lomnitz expands on this observation in pointing out that “the ideological, legal, and physical assault on communal village lands and other indigenous community institutions such as hospitals, public political offices, schools, and the management of community chests began in the first years of Independence.”

40. Ibid.
The dissolution of communal life was a state tactic for incorporating those who had resisted the imposition of alternative modes of citizenship, like Indios Bárbaros and Independent Indians. Among the laws that can be cited as instrumental in the process of incorporating the indigenous populations of Mexico into the larger “social organism” were those dealing with the question of colonization of and immigration to Mexico.42

European Immigration, 1821–1900s

One scholar of Latin America immigration argues that intercontinental emigration between 1824 and 1924 totaled “52 million individuals; some 72% of these set out for the U.S., while 21% departed for Latin America and only 7% for Australia.” Of the 11 million immigrants who settled in Latin America, 5.5 million (50 percent) settled in Argentina whereas 36 percent settled in Brazil. By contrast, Mexico received a mere 3 percent of the Latin American total.43 José Moya’s study—which covers a period four years earlier and eight years later—offers us some different numbers worth considering. According to his research, Europeans who migrated to various destinations between 1820 and 1932 totaled 56,183,000. The number of European immigrants to Mexico is half of one percent, just 270,000 by 1932. In contrast to Mörner’s total, Moya suggests that of the 56 million Europeans who emigrated, 13.4 million made their way to Latin America.

Of the 13.4 million Europeans that immigrated to Latin America between the 1820s and the 1950s, estimates are that almost 60 percent eventually settled in Argentina. Moya’s study of Argentina has not only generated some new numbers and statistics, but has also revolutionized the manner in which historians approach the question of transnational migrations to and from the Americas.44 Between 1820 and 1932, he es-

43. Mörner, *Adventurers and Proletarian*. For studies of immigration in Chile and Argentina, see Solberg, *Immigration and Nationalism*, and Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*.
44. Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, 46–47; See also Appendix 1.
Hernández, *Colonization Policies after Mexican Independence* 305

**Destination of European Overseas Emigrants, ca. 1820-1932**

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<th>Year Data Began</th>
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<td>56,183,000</td>
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Estimates that Argentina received 6.5 million immigrants, coming in second to the U.S., which took in 32.5 million immigrants. Third was Canada with 5 million for the same period. The greater percentage of immigrants to the U.S. was due to its geographical location, liberal land and immigration policies, higher wages, and a relatively low population density of indigenous peoples, a population that usually served to compete with incoming immigrants for wage labor. Argentina, too, offered higher wages than did Mexico during this period and did little to finance the travel costs of immigrants. Mexico would neither subsidize European immigrants to any significant degree, nor raise wages for their sake.

And although legislation favoring some groups over others is perhaps not as important for someone like Moya, I argue that it is crucial for understanding the question of national identity as it relates to a country's demographic composition. Besides, what better way to analyze how
a nation imagines itself if not by the very people who compose it? Legislation may not always be able to control who arrives in the country, but it certainly speaks volumes as to what kind of people are initially desired. Early ideas about immigration in Argentina favored North Americans and the English, but in the end, Argentina ended up with a population that was considered “least desirable” by the likes of Alberdi.\textsuperscript{45} Brazil, on the other hand, sought to replace African slave labor with industrious and pliable European immigrants but ultimately ended up abandoning immigration projects for low-wage local laborers by the 1930s.\textsuperscript{46}

Mexico’s approach was multifaceted and shaped by a large population of indigenous groups along its northern frontiers. Fear of land loss shaped this colonization policy and forced the country to incorporate a population who could act decidedly in a battle for supremacy, and later as a “buffer zone” between the center and periphery of Mexico. The difference among the three countries (Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil) is the presence of the United States.

What we can say from this brief overview of European immigration to Mexico is that by 1876, between 25,000 and 35,000 foreigners had taken up residence since the liberalization of immigration policies in 1823. The total number of European immigrants to Mexico increased to 116,527 by the end of the Porfiriato in 1910. By the end of the Great Depression, this number more than doubled to 270,000 according to some scholars, though Mexico was in thirteenth place among the nations that received immigrants during this period. By contrast, Argentina received 6,501,000 immigrants, followed by Canada (5,073,000), Brazil (4,361,000), and Cuba (1,394,000).\textsuperscript{37} In each of these countries, we can generally assume, laws were neither passed that restricted immigration to those of the Catholic faith nor was legislation ambivalent about its treatment of foreign immigrants. None of these countries had expulsion orders against Spaniards after independence comparable to Mexico.

This paradox of inviting Europeans to colonize Mexican territory and then seeing its own population migrate northward is something that did not occur in any other Latin American country. Even Francisco I. Madero, Mexico’s “apostle of democracy” and the first president of the revolution, lamented the situation in his country when he pointed out

\textsuperscript{45} Alberdi, \textit{Bases y puntos de partida}, 16.

\textsuperscript{46} George Reid Andrews has provided an interesting case study on the changing immigration policies of São Paulo, Brazil, by pointing out this change over time. Whereas early European settlements had failed well into the 1880s, European immigration would be privileged for four decades, only to be replaced by native Afro-Brazilians by the 1930s. See especially his Chapter 3, “Immigration, 1890–1930” in \textit{Blacks and Whites in São Paulo, Brazil}, 54–89.

\textsuperscript{47} Moya, \textit{Cousins and Strangers}, 46–47.
that “Mexico is the only country in all of the Americas where its nationals migrate abroad.”

Although the contrast between European immigration to Mexico and Mexican emigration to the U.S. is stark, it is important to keep in mind the historical context of this paradox. To begin with, although Mexico was one of the few countries to receive immigrants during this period, it shared a border with a northern neighbor (the preferred destination for 32.5 million immigrants) that also attracted Mexican laborers from the northern states of the republic—the very region that the country had struggled to settle and colonize prior to 1848. Thus, while Mexico sought to invite European settlers, if only on paper, its own laborers were migrating north in growing numbers, a trend that would escalate under the Porfirian regime.

**Post-Independence Ideologies of Mexico: Inclusion and Exclusion**

The version of the Mexican nation championed by the government of Agustín de Iturbide—the failed Constitutional Emperor whose administration lasted less than a year after Independence in 1821—was considered the most likely to succeed in modernizing the country according to western values and via symbols and rituals provided by the elite during the colonial period. Through various methods, the indigenous populations were obligated to “accept and assimilate the cultural values they [I turnbe’s government] upheld and recognized as the only possible government and nationality for the state—the Mexican nation.”

The noted intellectual José María Luis Mora summed up the postcolonial liberal stance when he pointed out that the Gómez Farias administration, which ruled during the following decades, ignored the distinctions “of past years that were proscribed in constitutional law, but he applied all his efforts towards forcing the fusion of the Aztec race with the general masses; thus he did not recognize the distinction between Indians and non-Indians in government acts, but instead he replaced it with one between the poor and the rich, extending to all the benefits of society.”

The goal was to transform the Indians who were the majority of the nation’s population into “Mexicans.” The government’s hope was that these new citizens would convert their property into private holdings.

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and subsequently become part of the global economy, enabling Mexico to join the larger community of “modern nations.” Here, the inclusion of the indigenous population also entailed the loss of the previous institutional protections these communities enjoyed during the colonial period. No longer able to rely on the large corporate holdings protected by the Spanish colonial system for 300 years, the indigenous peoples were expected to become private land owners who would be “self-sustaining” and, therefore, subject to state taxation and rationalization. For this reason, the immigration of Europeans—as individuals outside the “colonial constitutions” of the Mexican Indians—would assist in modernizing and rationalizing the republic.51

Another factor that had plagued colonial officials was the disproportionate concentration of the population in a handful of states around Mexico City. Magnus Morner notes, “The approximately seven million Mexicans who formed the population in 1821 were insufficient for a land that extended from Oregon to Yucatán and from Texas to Guatemala.”52 The state’s presence in the sparsely populated northern regions radiated outward from the center in the form of presidios, military colonies, and citizen-soldiers, whereas the church extended its influence via the extensive yet waning mission system.53

Most of Mexico’s population was concentrated in those areas where the state’s presence was more visible and most capable of protecting its citizens from the raids that were frequent in areas of low population density. The millions of Europeans migrating to the western hemisphere, it was hoped, would people the north.54 Joining them in this larger national project to settle terrenos baldíos would be the Mexicans concentrated in the center of the country.

Immigration debates after 1821 thus centered on two questions: whether the Mexican government should focus its energy on inviting Europeans to settle in Mexico or whether it should concentrate on what

51. The term “colonial constitution” is borrowed from Lomnitz and is intended to relay the notion that Indian republics after Independence were akin to “nations within a nation” and, therefore, constituted particular life worlds distinct from those of the Mexican Creoles—whose culture was not exclusively “European” either. See Exitos from the Labyrinth, 275.
54. Enrique Florescano states that the population for the whole northern province (Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, Nuevo México, Coahuila, and Texas) during the 1780s was around 220,400 out of a population that totaled well over 7 million. See “Colonización, ocupación del suelo y ‘frontera’ en el norte de Nueva España, 1521–1750,” Tierras: Expansión territorial y ocupación del suelo en América (siglos xvi–xix), Ponencias presentadas al IV Congreso Internacional de Historia Económica (México: El Colegio de México, 1968): 43–76.
was then known as “auto-colonización” or “colonization from the interior.”55 The latter entailed the resettling of a primarily indigenous population in those locations where the inhabitants were not considered sufficiently loyal to the state. The former entailed the immigration of European settlers to sparsely settled areas in the Mexican republic, offering them lands and then “Mexicanizing” them. The ideology of colonization in Mexico was based on a number of demographic particulars, and, as a result, very different immigration and colonization policies were developed there when compared to Argentina, Brazil, or the U.S. Two proposals submitted to the first Mexican Empire provide us with a detailed description of the country and illustrate the ideology behind colonization policy prior to its translation to legislation and decrees between 1821 and 1848.

**Early Proposals for Colonization: From Conquest to Colonization**

The most telling of these proposals was presented on December 29, 1821, to the governing junta following Independence from Spanish rule. Entitled *Dictamen Presentado a la Soberana Junta Gubernativa del Imperio Mexicano* (1821) [hereafter *Naciones Bárbaras de las Indias. Anglo-Americanos*], this extensive document made several observations, recommendations, and other suggestions that would outline colonization policy in the coming years.56 The policy shift in this document represents a significant departure from the colonial approach with regard to the process of colonizing—and, therefore, “civilizing”—the indigenous populations of the north. According to this document, “conquest” was out of the question and a different strategy of colonization would have to be employed along the northern corridors populated by Indios Bárbaros.

55. González-Polo y Acosta, “Colonización e inmigración extranjera, 4–7.
56. México, Junta Provisional Gubernativa, Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores. Dic
Presentado a la Soberana Junta Gubernativa del Imperio Mexicano por la Comisión
de Relaciones Exteriores en 29 de Diciembre de 1821, Primero de Independencia (México: Biblioteca Aportación Histórica, reprinted 1944); the extended version of this document actually entailed a more detailed foreign policy regarding Russia, Guatemala, England, and the vulnerable coastlines. For the sake of space and in order to focus on the topic at hand, I will be focusing on the two main focal points of this report. See Juan Francisco de Azcarate, *Dictamen Presentado a la Soberana Junta Gubernativa del Imperio Mexicano por la Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores en 29 de Diciembre de 1821, Primero de Independencia* (México: Publicaciones de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1932). Located at the AHSRE, Biblioteca José María Lafragua. [Hereafter cited as *Naciones Bárbaras de las Indias. Anglo-Americanos.*]
Beginning with a description of the largest of these indigenous groups in the northern part of the republic, Naciones Bárbaras suggests that it is “necessary to abandon all projects of conquest” because there were not enough people to settle those lands. The first observation reflects the recognition that—both in the past and at present—a sheer lack of bodies was available to populate and guard the northern frontiers. Employing an early version of cost-benefit analysis, the document noted the expensive nature of conquest, suggesting the best prospects for success lay in the establishment of friendly commercial ties with those areas where such ties did not exist and to maintain ties where they were already established. To continue,

The punctuality in complying with the treaties and good faith in commerce are the magnetism that attracts the Indians, and by this conduct they communicate their fruits and riches, they become civilized, they acquire the better uses and customs; and they are disposed unfeelingly to embrace the religion established in the Provinces and with the inhabitants of the reducciones and towns that have a relationship with them. If the Empire would adopt this measure it will achieve greater profits with lower expenses comparable to those realized by the English, the French, and the Anglo-Americans.57

The comparison with the French, English, and Anglo-American strategies of conquest is notable and illustrates the power and influence of the Indian nations themselves. Past experience had taught the Mexican government that indigenous populations could be manipulated and coerced by other European powers seeking to advance their expansionist projects in the Americas.58 The change in policy proposed in this document is that “conquest” be abandoned in favor of “colonization” but with the same end results. We can say, therefore, that although the strategy changed, the intention remained the same—the intention being to assimilate or acculturate the Indians forcefully into the larger “social organism.”

The change from a policy of “conquest” to one of “colonization” of the indigenous population is illuminating because it suggests a number of possibilities. First, it was motivated in part by the notion that the northern indigenous populations were so substantial that Mexico perceived this area as “stateless”—a widely held belief during the colonial period as well. Second, the transition to “colonization” in this document reveals that the Mexican state envisioned the indigenous population in those areas as potential colonists once commercial, social, and religious ties were established. Third, the comparison of Mexico with other nations

suggests that Mexico not only looked to these empires as examples, but also felt that it had the potential to achieve the international status of nations like the United States, England, and France. Finally, the identification of these nations as *Naciones Bárbaras* tells us that the Mexican government continued to make clear distinctions between those indigenes considered “civilized” and those considered “barbarous.” This document, in raising and answering the two main questions of the post-Independence era, is important because it lays out the colonization policies that would become law: what to do about “Barbarous [Indian] Nations” on the one hand and how to offset the “Anglo-Americans” on the other.

These same concerns are voiced in Ortiz de Ayala’s *Resumen de la estadística del imperio mexicano, 1822*, which I believe constitutes an intellectual precursor to the immigration and colonization policies that emerged in the years following Independence. Influenced by the Enlightenment ideas of the day—notably the writings of Adam Smith, Von Humboldt, and Melchor Gaspar de Jovellanos—Ortiz de Ayala’s attitudes toward the indigenous populations mirrored those expressed in *Naciones Bárbaras*. 59 Brief and yet erudite, *Resumen de la estadística del imperio mexicano, 1822*, covers geography, demography, economics, sources of wealth, and the problem with the government in the first part of the book and then offers suggestions in the second half of the book. Here, Ortiz de Ayala provides 115 recommendations on a variety of issues, including political thought, foreign policy, public education, labor, agriculture, industry, commerce, transportation, and finally colonization. 60

With respect to the question of colonization, Ortiz de Ayala discussed the importance of populating and settling a number of areas throughout the “Mexican Empire” within the context of his greater imaginings for the nation. These imaginings were directly tied to his main concern regarding populating the vast and rich areas of the country. According to Ortiz de Ayala,

The integrity of the national territory continues to be weak, [and] risks being lost if there is not a change in the system or an adoption of positive measures


60. Ortiz de Ayala’s influence in colonization policy recommendations cannot be overstated. Not only were many of his ideas implemented in subsequent colonization policies, but he also headed a number of colonization projects to Texas and in Coatzacoalcos in the years after the publication of this document. Edith Louise Kelly and Mattie Austin Hatcher, “Tadeo Ortiz de Ayala and the Colonization of Texas, 1822–1833,” *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 32 (February-April 1929).
to promote its security, by means of a strong local administration that is dependent on and conciliatory towards the federal government, [and] since that frontier point embraces the interests of the entire confederacy, it is the one who should take charge of its care and custody. 61

His preference for European immigrants is not stated in the section where he makes those recommendations. Instead, what is expressed, at least according to article 105, is the author’s excitement concerning Chinese and South Indian (the word “Indu” is used) immigrants. 62 These “hard-working inhabitants,” according to Ortiz de Ayala, are accustomed to the tropical climate of the Mexican coastal areas. 63 And although “foreign families” are mentioned and favored for colonization, they are mentioned within the same paragraph as “useful nationals,” “military veterans,” and “federal employees.” In short, the question of colonization in the aftermath of Independence is tied directly to the republic’s indigenous populations.

With respect to the northern territories with which this article is most concerned, Tadeo Ortiz de Ayala remains faithful to the Enlightenment ideals that had so influenced the intelligentsia during the Bourbon reforms as he condemns the cruel treatment of the indigenes by military and ecclesiastical authorities situated along the northern frontiers. 64 His commentary is worth quoting at some length here since he makes almost the exact same recommendations as had been made in Dic- tamen Presentado a la Soberana Junta Gubernativa del Imperio Mexicano, (1821). For Ortiz de Ayala,

The conduct of the cruel soldiers and the ignorant missionaries of the northern borders is neither the best means to attract the innumerable nations, whom the missions of the United States solicit with other political methods for the commercial advantage and growth of that nation. It is very sad to see a continuous and costly bloodthirsty war against towns that did no wrong to begin with, and that are called barbarian because they do not wish to be converted by force, while the protestant missionaries with their charity and sweetness are able to civilize, they convince with their persuasion, gaining the friendship of inmu-

61. Tadeo Ortiz de Ayala, Resumen de la estadística del imperio mexicano, 1822, 85.
62. As noted earlier, 12 million South Asians (Indians) and Chinese migrated to various parts of the world between 1820–1930, thus suggesting that Mexican intellectuals were attuned to global migrations.
63. It is interesting to note that Alberdi specifically points out that the migrations of Chinese and South Indians would not be good for the nation. For example, “Pero poblar no es civilizar, sino embutecer, cuando se puebla con chinos y con indios de Asia y con negros de Africa,” in Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la República de Argentina, 18.
64. Weber’s recent monograph, Bárbaros, provides the best background of those Enlightenment ideals regarding treatment of the indigenes.
Hernández, *Colonization Policies after Mexican Independence* 313

merable peoples, to the extent that our north provinces could cause incalculable harm in times of war with that republic.\(^{65}\)

The overarching concern of Ortiz de Ayala is that the indigenes be treated with a benevolent "sweetness" lest they be converted by the "Protestant missionaries" who can later "cause incalculable wrongs in times of war with that other republic [the U.S.]." Ortiz de Ayala advocates abandoning the previous politics of conquest in favor of a more "benevolent" and "sweet" policy of colonization as the "best means to incorporate [into the Mexican state] numerous nations," largely in the interest of *realpolitik*.

**Immigration Policies after Independence, 1821–1846**

As with much Mexican legislation that followed independence from Spain, several significant issues remained unresolved with the conclusion of hostilities, including a number of pending cases with respect to colonization of the northern frontier. The Spanish government had been aware for decades of the potential threats posed by the Americans, French, and Russians, so efforts to grant lands for colonization were well underway by the time of independence.\(^{66}\)

The best known and most crucial for understanding the evolution of colonization policy was a grant awarded to Moses Austin to settle 300 families in Texas in January of 1821. Spanish officials in Monterrey had authorized Austin to colonize what is now Texas when a number of events led to the reconfiguration of the original agreement between Austin and the fledgling Spanish government. The first was that the Mexican monarchy instituted by Iturbide fell not long afterward, thus rendering all previous contracts null and void. Second was the fact that the elder Austin died before he could act on the grant, which was taken up by his son Stephen F. Austin. The younger Austin began to lead families into Texas in mid-1822 with the knowledge of the governor of Texas at San Antonio de Bexar.

Because the Mexican government was still organizing itself in the wake of independence, Austin opted to travel to Mexico City to confirm the specifics of his colonization plan. According to one scholar of this era, "Austin ... spent all of 1822 and part of 1823 in Mexico City validating a Texas land grant that the Spanish colonial government had con-

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\(^{65}\) Ibid., 21. My italics.

ferred on his father.”

By the time Austin returned to Texas, the newly independent republic had passed a newer and updated colonization law that restructured the older law under which the elder Austin had been awarded his grant. The first colonization law, however, is worth going over for the purposes of comparison with the national colonization law published a year later.

The colonization contract that approved the land grant to Moses Austin in 1821 emanated from the Northern territories and was subsequently replicated in the Imperial Colonization Law of 1823. Certain features of Austin’s contract became standard and were codified in federal law, illustrating the effect of peripheral and regional particularities on federal legislation. Here is one example of the legislative borrowing the dialectical relationship between the northern territories and Mexico City. This legislative pattern persisted throughout the century as the central government sought to extend its hegemony within the peripheries. All contracts between the Spanish government and other northern state officials were eventually nullified with the publication of the more comprehensive Imperial Colonization Law of 1823. This colonization law was approved during the brief reign of Emperor Agustín I and would be replaced by a national colonization law a year and a half later.

Contrary to historians’ claims concerning the “whitening” of Mexico (similar to what occurred in Brazil or Argentina), at least according to the Imperial Colonization Law of 1823, the articles of the law do not reveal anything that would indicate this particular objective, particularly considering that the law privileged war veterans, Mexicans, and Europeans who married Mexican women. Moreover, Article 18 states that “natives of the country shall have a preference in the distribution of land; and particularly the military of the “Army of the Three Guarantees,” in conformity with the decree of the 27th of March, 1821; and also those who served in the first epoch of the insurrection.” And in sup-


69. Austin received his first contract from the Spanish government, but before the Imperial Colonization Law was implemented, he secured another grant from the government of Coahuila y Texas. Because of the many colonization laws being passed, a need arose for a more comprehensive and practical standard. Indeed, “with no published compendium of the Mexican laws, administrative and judicial authority rested with Austin, and the result was a mix of Mexican decrees with pragmatic Anglo-American implementation.” See Margaret Swett Henson, Handbook of Texas Online, “Anglo American Colonization,” http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/AA/uma1.html (accessed December 19, 2006).
port of my earlier point regarding the ongoing “Mexicanization” of the nation, Article 27 injects a third element intended to incorporate foreigners into the nation when it states, “Those with the foregoing qualifications who marry Mexicans will acquire particular credit for obtaining letters of citizenship.” This example of legislated “Mexicanization,” or “assimilation,” clearly contradicts some of the interpretations that I discussed in the historiographical section.

In effect, one could argue that this particular colonization policy not only sought to provide settlers with lands that would serve collectively as a buffer zone between Mexico and the expansionist U.S., but it also sought to “Mexicanize” these colonists by requiring them to convert to Catholicism and later be naturalized as “Mexican.” As for the indigenous populations, it states that “natives of the country shall have a preference in the distribution of land,” as suggested in the *Dictamen Presentado a la Soberana Junta Gubernativa del Imperio Mexicano por la Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores en 29 de Diciembre de 1821*.

The similarity between the new national law a year later and the earlier imperial law are quite telling, and the few changes made were done so in the interest of space. In terms of what this document tells us about how the nation imagines itself, we can draw the same conclusions from this as from the *Imperial Colonization Law of 1823*. Despite the fact that these policies clearly illustrate a preference for Mexicans willing to colonize the northern frontier, another piece of legislation from the frontier is worth examining here in order to observe how the incorporation of the indigenous populations was ultimately inserted into the legislative workings of colonization policy.

The *Colonization Law of the State of Coahuila and Texas, 1825*, is the final piece of colonization policy that we will examine in this section before analyzing the exclusionary law of April 6, 1830, that prohibited the further migration of Euro-American settlers from the U.S. to Mexico. This law testifies to the dialectical relationship between state


71. For example Bucheneau argued that Mexico had no assimilation process for immigrations. See “Small Numbers, Great Impact,” 23–49.

72. The translation “natives” has changed over time, but the Spanish version is less ambiguous in its meaning when it clearly states, “Se atender con preferencia para la distribución de las tierras los naturales del pais . . .” The term “naturales” literally translates into “naturals” and was a term first employed by the Spaniards to describe the “natives” of the land.

73. A copy of English translation is available at “Colonization Law of the State of Coahuila and Texas 1825,” http://www.tamu.edu/ccbn/dewitt/cololaws.htm#coahuila; a similar law to the Coahuilan legislation is the Colonization Law of Tamaulipas in 1826. See
and federal colonization policy, especially via the inclusion of local and regional specifics that illustrate how the indigenous populations were incorporated into the nation via colonization policy. One of the main distinctions posited by this particular colonization law is made clear by its open reference to the incorporation of the region’s “wandering tribes.” According to Article 19,

The Indians of all nations, bordering on the state, as well as wandering tribes that may be within its limits, shall be received in the markets, without paying any duties whatever for commerce in the products of the country; and if attracted by the moderation and confidence, with which they shall be treated, any of them, after having first declared themselves in favor of our Religion and Institutions, wish to establish themselves in any settlements that are forming, they shall be admitted, and the same quantity of land given them, as to the settlers spoken of in the 14th and 15th articles, always preferring native Indians to “strangers.”

Note the double move where the law requires a declaration that favors the religion and institutions of Mexico while at the same time affirming that the colonization and settlement of the indigenes is always more preferable to that of “strangers.” The two articles mentioned—the 14th and 15th—are familiar because they were written into law in the previous colonization policies that we have examined. Foreigners in this regard are “strangers,” whereas “the Indians of all nations are preferred to strangers.” More explicit but less talked about is the open reference to the notion of “always preferring native Indians to strangers” and the “Indians of all nations, bordering on the state, as well as wandering tribes.” In this case, clearly the inclusion of the indigenes is intended to work itself out in the form of a policy whereby the local inhabitants are eventually assimilated into the system. The exclusion of other peoples, coincidentally, would take place during the first Spanish expulsion in the late 1820s.

The laws mentioned previously, despite their overt preference for native Mexicans and indigenous groups, did not have their intended effect, and soon the northern frontiers were flooded with thousands of Euro-American and American settlers. Just five years after the passage of the 1830 law, the “Anglo-Texas and slave population had grown to about 24,700 inhabitants, outnumbering Mexican Texans ten to one.” Encouraged by the enactment of these liberal land policies, Euro-American settlers mostly from the trans-Appalachia states of Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana entered Texas to take ad-


74. Reséndez, Changing National Identities, 22.
vantage of inexpensive land and numerous concessions afforded to potential settlers.75

The events that transpired thereafter, which ultimately led to the loss of Texas and the defeat of General President Santa Anna in 1836, is a topic of great interest and debate and certainly well beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say that the growing migration of these Euro-American settlers certainly provided the structural conditions (demographically) for what later became known as the “Texas Revolution of 1836.” The Mexican government had been aware of the problem posed by these settlers and had passed a law five years earlier prohibiting further migration to Mexico, but to no avail.

**Toward Exclusion: Colonization Policy during the Mid-Nineteenth Century**

This alarming increase in population, along with an 1828 report on frontier conditions submitted by General Manuel Mier y Terán, caused the federal government in Mexico City to implement what has become known as the *Law of April 6, 1830.*76 This law, composed of eighteen articles and quite explicit in its intentions, is a project calculated to exclude foreigners from its territory, even as regional authorities argued in favor of continued migration to these areas.77 Articles 7 and 9 are central to the process of exclusion as they testify not only to a fear of a potential takeover by these settlers, but also to a national hysteria concerning foreigners; another expression of the latter phenomenon was the expulsion orders against Spaniards between 1821 and 1836.78

In order to prevent Euro-American demographic dominance, the law

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77. “Decreto permitiendo la introducción de algunos géneros de algodón; destinos de los derechos que produzcan y providencias sobre colonización y comercio, Abril 6 de 1830,” *Código de colonización,* 241-244.

78. See, for example, Berninger’s chapter “Rhetoric and Reality,” which registers a number of abuses against foreigners. “Mexican Attitudes Toward Immigration,” 81-111; also for copies of the expulsion orders, see Harold Sims, *Descolonización en México: El conflicto entre mexicanos y españoles (1821–1831),* (México: Fondo de la Cultura Económica, 1982), 243–256. See also AHSRE, 1–1–47; “Se recomienda al Gobernador del
called for the introduction of more Mexican settlers to the area. Article 7 states that “Mexican families that voluntarily want to colonize will be helped with the trip; maintained for a year, given lands and other tools for work.” This article of inclusion has as its counterpart one of exclusion in Article 9: “The entrance of foreigners under any pretext without being provided with a passport issued by the agents of the Republic, at the point of origin, is prohibited along the northern border.” The entrance of slavers was also explicitly prohibited in this law, even though the practice had been outlawed since Independence. The exclusion of slaves was not intended to keep out African Americans due to any racialized ideology that targeted people of African descent, but was rather a political move intended to discourage the migration of more settlers from the southern United States, many of whom brought slaves with them. In the end, this law was not successful in expelling settlers who had crossed over into Mexican territory to colonize the northernmost regions of the republic.

What was worse, the law had the unintended consequence of inciting the colonists to rebellion, which grew into an “Independence movement” leading to the eventual secession of Texas from the Mexican republic and its annexation a decade later by the U.S. This action, as many historians in this field have already concluded, ultimately led to a break in diplomatic relations between the two countries and culminated in the Mexican American War of 1846–1848.

While some Europeans were being invited into the “larger Mexican family,” others were being asked to leave by force. Anti-Spanish sentiment had come to the surface during the wars for Independence when upwards of 1/8th of the “white” population went under the knife, culminating in the tragic events of the “Alhóndiga de Granaditas” in 1810. The antagonism directed by Mexicans toward gachupines soon shifted to other European groups considered a threat to the nation. When the Mexican government passed a law in the early 1820s reserving the right to expel any foreigner who hindered the struggle for independence, foreign governments requested assurances that their citizens had legal rights to remain in the country.

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79. “Decreto permitiendo la introducción de algunos géneros de algodón; destinos de los derechos que produzcan y providencias sobre colonización y comercio, Abril 6 de 1830,” Código de colonización, 241–244.
80. Ibid.
82. For an overview of this violence, see Marco Antonio Landavazo, “De la razón moral a la razón de estado: violencia y poder en la insurgencia Mexicana,” Historia Mexicana LIV, 3 (2004): 833–865.
as long as they did not meddle in Mexican affairs.\textsuperscript{83} It was precisely this fear of European interference that eventually led to the expulsion of the Spaniards on three separate occasions between 1821 and 1836. Although the main expulsions did not begin until 1827, tensions had been building amidst the struggle for Independence.

Between 1821 and 1836, five national laws and a number of state-level expulsions were implemented in order to rid the Mexican nation of its Spanish populace. According to Harold Dana Sims, who has spent a lifetime examining Spanish expulsions after Independence, only about a quarter of the 1827 total of Spaniards remained in Mexico when recognition finally came in 1836, just as Texas was being lost to European and North American colonists. When the first expulsion took place in late December of 1827, 1,823 passports were issued and departure lists recorded 1,771 exiles. The following year 885 peninsulares left on their own followed by 53 servants.\textsuperscript{84} The inclusion of particular peoples along with the exclusion of others are illustrated with these mass expulsions of Spaniards.\textsuperscript{85}

The case of Texas loomed large in subsequent colonization policy. A circular published a decade later makes this apparent. The circular was intended as a reminder to those who would take charge of the Dirección de Colonización in late 1846. According to that circular,

\textsuperscript{83} AHSRE, 4–24–7070, “Se les dice a los comisionados de Inglaterra que los extranjeros que el presidente puede expulsar, son los que atenten contra la Independencia o sistema de gobierno de México, 1824.”

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 55.

\textsuperscript{85} It is interesting to note here that in Argentina, although Spaniards were not desired according to Alberdi, they were not targeted for exclusion via expulsion orders as in Mexico.
The only one [colonization policy] that has been established and that has prospered, is the one that rebelled in Texas, because the thought of its establishment was not for an economic or commercial venture, but for the usurpation of our territory, taking advantage of the youthful innocence with which the Republic extended its arms to all of the foreign nations without fear during the first days of its independent existence. 86

Here, there is no indication of a policy of “whitening”; the Mexican government’s promotion of immigration reflected the nation’s social and demographic realities. The U.S. took advantage of a young and naïve Mexico as it opened its arms to foreign immigration. The circular suggests that Mexico has now grown up and is no longer naïve.

Between the three mass expulsions, the National Colonization Law of 1824, and the break in diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Mexico in 1846, no other colonization laws or decrees of any substance were passed. 87 The legislation approving the creation of a Department of Colonization in 1846 signaled the importance of having one agency manage and encourage immigration. This law was enacted during the Mexican American War in 1846—a war that would not end for another fourteen months. It was a case of too little, too late for the inhabitants of the territories that would ultimately be lost to the U.S. Until then, little would change in terms of immigration policy. Afterward, Mexican expatriates and Indians were not only specifically mentioned within the national project, but also served as symbols of exclusion in other instances when the nation’s territorial integrity was threatened.

If we take into account the number of immigration and colonization laws that were passed after the war until the beginning of 1876, at least according to the Código de colonización y terrenos baldíos de la republica mexicana, the same pattern regarding the inclusion of the indigenes that I have outlined appears to continue. 88 Laws passed seemed to echo the sentiments of José María Lacunza, postwar Secretary of the Interior, when he noted the following contradiction about immigration and colonization policies for the latter half of the nineteenth century,

86. “Circular de 4 de Diciembre de 1846, recomandando la exacta observanciade las medidas que contiene el decreto expedido para el establecimiento de la Dirección de Colonización,” Código de Colonización, 360.
87. Several state laws and decrees are registered; however, they never supersede national legislation. See Harold Dana Sims, The Expulsion of Mexico’s Spaniards, 1821–1836 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 37.
88. Francisco F. De la Maza, Código de colonización y terrenos baldíos de la republaca mexicana (México: Oficina Tipografica de la Secretaria de Fomento, 1893), 936–945; how these inclusionary measures play out in practice, especially among the various indigenous groups in Mexico, is beyond the scope of this essay.
The allotment of lands which are used to invite new settlers, being offered them by liberal concessions, would resemble sarcasm, if at the same time indigenous peoples don’t merit, oddly in their own land, the prudent consideration of the Government. The old population should also be attended to, so that it multiplies and prospers; and its prosperity cannot be expected without easy means and abundant forms of nourishment that are not possible without productive lands for the inhabitants of the country to work.\(^{89}\)

Laws passed encouraging European immigration are almost always accompanied by references to “Mexicanization,” or to incentives for incorporating indigenous and Mexican families founded by those few European colonies. Whether these laws were implemented to any degree by indigenous communities is another question, but to suggest that “whitening” was somehow part of the national project is a thesis that requires some modification.

Policies favoring Europeans over Mexicans would not be part of the Porfrián project of colonization either. The Porfrián period between 1876 to 1911 would surely reflect nationalist ideology in terms of immigration and colonization principles intended to reimplement repatriation of the frontier. New laws, especially the \textit{1883 Land and Colonization Law}, would extend invitations for Mexicans in the United States to “return to the homeland” with the most preferential treatment ever written into Mexican Immigration and Colonization policies during the nineteenth century. Article XVI of the 1883 law demonstrates this new agenda in terms of Mexico’s evolving colonization and immigration policies when it stipulates that “Mexicans residing in a foreign country who are desirous of establishing themselves in the uninhabited frontiers of the Republic will have the right to a free land grant, up to an extension of 200 hectares (double that of foreign immigrants) and enjoy for fifteen years, the exemptions granted by the this law.”\(^{90}\)

\textbf{Conclusion}

Mexico liberalized its immigration policies throughout the nineteenth century, but ultimately a number of factors prevented large-scale immigra-

\(^{89}\) México, \textit{Memoria del Ministro de Relaciones Interiores y Exteriores Leída en las Cámaras en 1851} (México: Imprenta de Vicente García Torres, 1851), 13.

\(^{90}\) Secretaría de Fomento, \textit{Memoria Presentada al Congreso de la Unión por el Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Fomento, Colonización, Industria y Comercio de la República Mexicana. General Carlos Pacheco Corresponde á los años Transcurridos de Enero de 1883 á Junio de 1885}, 5 vols (México: Oficina Tipográfica de la Secretaría de Fomento, 1887), I,185–190; see also Francisco F. De la Maza, \textit{Código de colonización y terrenos baldíos de la república mexicana} (México: Oficina Tipografica de la Secretaria de Fomento, 1893), 936–945.
tion of Europeans to that country. In the midst of these futile efforts to attract European immigrants to settle the northern frontiers, Mexico saw the process set in motion by which the loss of its northern territories resulted due to those regions being underpopulated. Those who eventually did inhabit those regions were Anglo-Americans and other Euro-American settlers who had been arriving in Texas since the early nineteenth century. Mexicans who remained within the ceded territories were later asked to settle the northernmost regions of Mexico in order to act as a buffer between that nation and the U.S. This experience would impact colonization and immigration policy thereafter. Nevertheless, European immigrants did come to Mexico during the nineteenth century, although in smaller numbers than was the case in countries such as Argentina, the U.S., or Brazil. Most would not settle in government-sponsored colonies but instead chose to live in various urban centers of the republic.

This essay examined post-Independence immigration laws and the role of Indios Bárbaros, in particular how their demographic and strategic positions influenced the direction and ultimate implementation of Mexican colonization policy throughout the nineteenth century. The demographic and strategic position of Indios Bárbaros, migrant Indians, and Independent Indians after Mexican Independence, especially along the northern frontiers, influenced the direction and ultimate implementation of racialized immigration-cum-colonization policies during the nineteenth century. Many intellectuals have argued that one of the primary reasons for dramatic U.S. economic growth and aggressive westward expansion was the arrival of European immigrants, a trend that Mexico also sought to capitalize on. Unlike its neighbors, however, Mexico received few of these immigrants because of restrictive policies influenced by unsuccessful colonization schemes and three Spanish expulsions. Previous historiographies have usually interpreted past immigration and colonization policies as “failures” to “whiten” the population, but as Chakrabarty reminds the historian, “There was always room in this story for characters who embodied, on behalf of the native, the theme of inadequacy or failure.”

The conclusions reached in this essay contradict a view in the historiography that suggests these policies, like those in Argentina or Brazil, were implemented to “whiten” the populations, and as such, were “failures” of Mexican immigration and colonization policies. Mexico’s immigration policies emerged in large part as a way to incorporate the majority of the indigenous populace into the larger “Mexican family” but also as a way to “Mexicanize” communities outside of state control.