SYLLABUS
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY: HISTORY AND
SYSTEMS
Psychology 6301
Fall
The purpose of the course is to provide graduate students with a
metatheoretical perspectives on the science and profession of psychology as
these institutions have evolved
into the
The objective of the course is get you to
think like a literate, mature scientist.
This requires the examination of central issues in the science studies: The science studies
include the history, sociology and philosophy of science. The only thing certain about the future
of any social institution including science is that it will change. The dynamics of change in science is
covered in the assignments and lectures on paradigm theory. Changes in theory, facts, methodology is
universal in all sciences.
Presuppositions are the scientist's assumptions concerning the
characteristics and appropriate content, objectives and methods of a field. They are a partly tacit set of
intellectual commitments, that can be viewed as paradigmatic in nature, and they
rationalize and guide the practice of basic and applied science. Presuppositions differ among various
“subcultures” in psychology. We examine the subcultures (paradigms of
behaviorism, cognitivism, etc.) and their particular conceptions of
psychological knowledge resulting from their specific presuppositional
commitments. Our study of
metatheory also includes the structure and function of theoretical systems and
the nature of mathematical representation. A main objective of the course is to
supplement technical and professional training with an analysis of
metatheoretical issues that are typically absent in your other
courses.
GRADING
READING ASSIGTNMENTS AND
SYNOPSES
Required
Textbook:
DeWitt, R. (
Journal Articles and Chapters:
Klemke, E. D., Robert Hollinger, David Wyss Rudge, A.
David Kline (1998). Introductory
All of the selections from Klemke et al have been edited and simplified by
the editors. Additional articles,
selected from core scientific and professional journals, are in their original
form.
All assigned readings (except DeWitt,
\\VAQUERO\library\Lachman\ 6301\ Fall
There are a number of titles in the files that are no longer required.
Much of
contemporary science and current professional practice is reactive and can only
be understood adequately in terms of the events, historical and contemporary,
that are being reacted to. The
factual basis for most of my lectures are in citations in the annotated
bibliography that follows the reading assignments.
There
is minimum duplication between lectures and readings. Most historical content, including
the 17th century scientific revolution up to and including logical
positivism, and behaviorism vs cognitivism are covered exclusively in the
lectures. For articles and chapters with a high density of unknown
words/concepts, use Goggle,
Synopses Requirement and
Format
The synopsis
requirement is an analysis of each reading, a half page to a full page in size (cf.
example below). For the
Synopses are due
each week on Wednesday at 1PM.
Please include your name, the class# and author in the
attached doc file and put your name and
the assignment class# in the SUBJECT heading of the
e-mail.
Below is
an example of an “A” synopses. If
you make an “A” in all assignments, you are exempt from the final
exam.
Robert Suchting, April
Class #1
The readings for week 1
Article
1: The Era of Systems and Schools
of Psychology:
1890-1935
Hilgard starts us out with
the note that psychology has often relied on strong leaders to keep movements in
the discipline going. These leaders
generally take charge of a school (group of disciples or followers of a dominant
person) or a system (a logical structure that unifies and makes comprehensible
obtained data). A leader can take
charge of one, or the other, or both.
The first paradigm discussed is Structuralism. Here, followers of this system made
several modifications of Wundt’s ideas:
the definition of psychology itself was redefined, for example (now
thought of as a study of the facts of experience as dependent on the
experiencing individual). One of
the leaders of this paradigm was Titchener, who also wrote the book “Textbook of
Psychology” in 1910. This book
defined the focus of psychology as several things: sensation, affection, attention,
perception, association, memory, imagination, action, emotion, and thought. Other key ideas here were that “science
is built on nothing more than facts and logic” and that the nervous system is
thought of as within psychology’s domain.
Following this, the author delves into a discussion of
Functionalism. The primary leaders
here were Dewey and Angell, the latter of which held open debates with
Titchener. This debate is the focus
of the first part of the discussion of Functionalism; Titchener’s psychology of
content is contrasted with Angell’s
psychology of function. The primary issue here was the
question: what falls into the
domain of psychology? Titchener’s
view was more restrictive, while Angell thought psychology could have both
aspects of a basic science and have practical usage at the same time. Angell and
Behaviorism became the focal point of psychology with its emphasis on the
experiment and close affiliations with physiology and biology. Behaviorism was noted to have a
preoccupation with methodology and finding an appropriate one to study
behavior. John Watson, one of
Angell’s students, proposed methodologies that did not feature introspection;
rather, he proposed the study of the conditioned reflex. It was surprising to me that behaviorism
did not receive more focus here, as it seems to be exalted as one of the most
important revolutions in psychology.
The next major system was that of Hormic Psychology, led here by William
McDougall. He also defined
psychology as the study of behavior, independent of John Watson. The central focus of this study was instinct. McDougall authored an influential
book: “An Introduction to Social
Psychology.” However, the book that
is most important to the discussion here is “Outline of Psychology”
(19
The final paradigms discussed by Hilgard get a cursory look. First up is Gestalt Psychology, which
held a holistic emphasis (that is, the whole has primacy over its parts). This conceptualization rejected
atomistic and reductionistic views.
Kurt Lewin’s Field Theory is also discussed quickly as an offshoot of
Gestalt Psychology. The final
paradigm overviewed is Psychoanalysis, but it is really only given lip service
at this point. Hilgard concludes
his work with a short section describing the state of psychological thought in
1935, where many major systems had been defined and major contributions thereof
had been identified. However, only
two of these paradigms persisted:
behaviorism and psychoanalysis.
Article
Sperry (the author here) offers up a question posed by B. F.
Skinner: “Can the {snip}
Psychology 6301 Fall
Send synopses to rlachman@uh.edu (Assignments
Revised 8/1/
Fall
|
# of
pages | |
Worldviews: An Introduction to
the History and Philosophy of Science. |
Richard DeWitt ( |
|
Due Week
|
Total
pages |
43 |
Intoduction |
All |
3 |
Part I: Fundamental
Issues: |
All |
|
Chap
1. Worldviews |
All |
10 |
Chap
|
All |
16 |
Chap
3. Empirical Facts and Philosophical/Conceptual
"Facts" |
All |
6 |
Chap
4. Confirming and Disconfirming Evidence and
Reasoning |
All |
8 |
Due Week
3 |
pages |
47 |
Chap
5. The Quine-Duhem Thesis and Scientific Method |
All |
1 |
In chapters with
abridgeed assignment, always read concluding remarks at the end of the
chapter |
|
|
Chap
6. A Philosophical Interlude: Problems and Puzzles of
Induction |
to p 61 Hemple's
Raven Paradox |
4 |
Chap
7. Falsifiability |
All |
6 |
Chap
8. Instrumentalism/Realism |
All |
6 |
All of the
following chapters are designed to illustrate and elucidate the
interaction between the following elements in physical science: |
| |
Part II: The Transition from
the Aristotelian Worldview to the Newtonian
Worldview: |
|
|
Chap
9. The Structure of the Universe on the Aristotelian
Worldview |
All |
7 |
Chap 10: All, pp
9 |
| |
Chap
10. The Preface to Ptolemy's Almagest |
See
above |
5 |
Chap
11. Astronomical Data: The Empirical Facts |
All |
7 |
Due Week
4 |
pages |
5 |
Chap
1 |
All |
7 |
Chap
13. The Ptolemaic System |
Scan, if you
understand the issues |
|
Chap
14. The Copernican System |
Read |
1 |
Chap
15. The Tychonic System |
Skip |
|
Chap
16. Kepler's System |
Skip |
|
Chap
17. Galileo and the Evidence from the Telescope |
Read p 164-167,
scan the rest, |
4 |
Chap
18. A Summary of Problems Facing the Aristotelian
Worldview |
Read |
|
Chap
19. Philosophical and Conceptual Connections in the Development of the New
Science |
Read |
6 |
Chap
|
Read |
5 |
Part III: |
|
|
Chap
|
Read
187-19 |
8 |
Chap
|
p |
3 |
Chap
|
Skip |
|
Chap
|
Skip |
|
Chap
|
Skip |
|
Chapter
|
| |
Chap
|
Optional |
|
Chap
|
Skip |
|
Chap
|
Skip |
|
Chap
|
Read |
7 |
Chapter Notes, References, and
Suggested |
Scan |
|
|
Science, pseudoscience and
demarcation |
|
|
Class meeting 05
|
In
Klemke et al: Popper, K. Science: Conjectures and refutations.
|
10 |
|
Class meeting 05
|
In
Klemke et al: Thagard. P. Why Astrology is a pseudoscience? |
10 |
|
Class meeting
05 |
In
Klemke et al: Kitcher, P. Believing where we cannot prove. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Class meeting 05:
|
Psychology and social
science |
|
|
Class meeting
05 |
In
Klemke et al: Machlup, F. Are the social sciences really inferior?
(Undergraduate teaching) |
|
64 |
|
|
|
|
|
Observation
and objectivity |
|
|
Class meeting
06 |
Kaplan, Abraham. (1964) The
conduct of inquiry. |
5 |
|
Class meeting 06
|
Duhem,
P. (1954) The aim and structure of physical theory. Princeton, |
3 |
|
Class meeting 06
|
Zuriff, G. E. (1986). Precise
of Behaviorism: A conceptual reconstruction. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences. 9, 687-699. |
1 |
|
Class meeting 06
|
Lachman, R. (1988).
Behaviorism: Counterarguments are pointless. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences. 11, 165-168. |
3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Theory
and Confirmation |
|
|
Class meeting 06
|
In
Klemke et al: Frank, P.G. The variety of reasons for the acceptance of
scientific theories |
11 |
|
Class meeting 06
|
In
Klemke et al: Giere Justifying Scientific Theories |
|
54 |
Class meeting 07
|
In
Klemke et al: Kuhn: Theory Choice |
16 |
|
Class meeting 07
|
In
Klemke et al: Quine W.V. and Ullian, J.S. Hypothesis. |
11 |
|
Class meeting 07
|
In
Klemke et al: Toulmin Do sub-microscopic entities exist?. |
4 |
|
Class meeting 07
|
Copi,
I.M. (1960) Crucial experiments, pp |
4 |
|
Class meeting 07
|
Simon,
H. A. (1990). Prediction and prescription in system modeling. Operations Research, 38,
7-13 |
6 |
|
Class meeting
07 |
Bennett,
M. R. and. Hacker, P. M, S ( |
10 |
51 |
|
|
|
|
|
Explanation and
Understanding |
|
|
Class meeting 08
|
In
Klemke et al: Kitcher, P. Explanatory unification |
|
|
Class meeting
08 |
Kendler: H.H. (1981).
Psychology: A science in conflict. |
45 |
69 |
|
|
|
|
|
Paradigm
theory and the New Integrated Science Studies (Phil, Hist, Soc of
Science) |
|
|
Class meeting 09
|
Lachman, R. and Lachman, J. L.
A significant step forward. Contemporary Psychology. 1979, |
|
|
Class meeting
09 |
Von
Eckardt, B. (1993). What is cognitive science? |
44 |
|
Class meeting
09 |
Lachman, R. (1994) Foundational
issues in cognitive science: Important, erudite, and understandable.
Contemporary Psychology, 39, 109 |
|
|
Class meeting
09 |
Giere,
Ronald N. (1993) Cognitive Models of Science. |
6 |
|
Class meeting 09
|
Giere,
Ronald N (1994)Reply.mht |
3 |
57 |
|
Reductionism |
|
|
Class meeting 10
|
Thagard, P. ( |
5 |
|
Class meeting 10
|
Kendler (p1 |
7 |
|
Class meeting 10
|
Gold,
Ian & Stoljar, Daniel. (1999). A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of
neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences |
13 |
|
Class meeting 10
|
3
readings or scan/ 1 synopses Self-Organizing Systems FAQ; Decker: et al Self-Organizing
Systems: A Tutorial in Complexity; Encyclopedia of
self-organization The tutorial on complexity theory
and the outlines of self-organizing systems may be rather dense.
Since this area will significantly impact all of psychology, I would like
you to get an idea of what is going on. Write one synopsis for all that
material.. |
Explain |
|
|
The
Legend: Logical Positivism and Logical Empiricism |
|
|
Class meeting 10
|
Dupré,
J. (1995) Review of Kitcher "The Advancement of Science: Science without
Legend, Objectivity without Illusions" Philosophical Review 104, 147-151
|
5 |
|
Class meeting 10
|
Kitcher, (1993). The
Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without
Illusions. |
10 |
40+ |
|
|
|
|
|
Part- |
|
|
|
Views
of paradigms in psychology and metapsychology |
|
|
Class meeting 11
|
Rakover, Sam S_ (1993)
Metapsychology, Psycoloquy.mht |
5 |
|
Class meeting
11 |
Stephen S. Ilardi and David
Feldman. ( |
|
|
Class meeting 11
|
Lachman, Lachman, and
Butterfield. (1979). Cognitive Psychology and Information Processing.
|
|
51 |
To
be considered |
Lachman,
R. ( |
In
class |
|
|
Evolution
and psychology (includes Scientific validity, explanation and
reductionism): |
|
|
Class meeting 1 |
Ketelaar, T & Ellis, B.J.
( |
|
|
Class meeting
1 |
Ellis,
B. J., & Ketelaar, T. ( |
1 |
|
Class meeting
1 |
Steven
Rose (1999).Precis of Lifelines: Biology, freedom, determinism.
Behavioural and Brain Science |
|
|
Class meeting
1 |
Rose
vs Pinker.pdf (debate) |
8 |
60 |
Class meeting
1 Optional |
Charles Darwin Chap14
Conclusions.pdf |
Classic |
|
|
|
|
|
Class meeting 13 |
Final Exam |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Views
of the history of psychology |
|
|
Class meeting 14:
|
Hilgard, E.R. (1987).
Psychology in |
30 |
|
|
Law
and Dauber; How to use metatheory aand science. |
|
|
Class meeting 14 |
Sanders et al. ( |
15 |
|
|
Issues
in metatheory and psychotherapy |
|
|
Class meeting 14:
|
Mahrer, A.R. ( |
8 |
53 |
Part 1: Introduction and overview of
philosophy of psychology and philosophy of science:.
Bunge, M. and Ardila, R. (1988)
Philosophy of psychology.
Verlag. Chap 1,
Bechtel, W. (1988). Philosophy of
science.
Part
A. Historical antecedents and
intellectual precursors.
There are no required assignments in
historical antecedents because I cover the central issues in my lectures. Much
of contemporary science and current professional practice is reactive and can
only be understood adequately in terms of the events, historical and
contemporary, that are being reacted
to. The factual basis for my lectures on the 17th century scientific
revolutions and some of the essential
attributes of the new science are based on Mason.
Mason, Stephen F. (196
If you omitted a History and Systems
course as an undergraduate: Read
the sections on systems of psychology in a good history and systems text such as
Kendler (1987) or Hilgard (1987). The systems (paradigms) that should be covered
are Structuralism, Functionalism, Behaviorism, Psychoanalysis, and Gestalt. This
material should be read over the next several weeks in conjunction with the
regular assignments. Also read the Hilgard chapters:
Hilgard, E.R. (1987). Psychology in
Part 3: The decline of logical positivism
and its replacement by paradigm theory.
A. Logical
positivism.
We cover the classical viewpoint of
logical empiricism (Vienna Circle Logical Positivism) in class, none of the
readings are required. If you inadvertently miss the lecture, read Ayer. The
logical empiricist's position on the nature of scientific inquiry can only be
understood from the broad perspective of their general doctrines. Logical
positivism is not to be understood as a monolithic set of formulations.
It is best characterized as a family of loosely related viewpoints and positions
represented in the earlier writings of Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Hans
Reichenbach, Kurt Godel, Otto Neurath, Moritz Schlick, Herbert Feigl, and
others. They were strongly influenced by Albert Einstein, Bertram Russell, G.E.
Moore, and L. Wittgenstein whose work possessed certain related aims and content
and was frequently singled out for its kinship to the Viennese group. Their
supporters in the
Stevens, S. S. (1939). Operationism and
logical positivism. Psychological Bulletin, 36,
Ayer's book of readings is the best
single source on logical positivism in its classical form; it contains the most
important doctrinal papers of the leading positivists. The books by Frank and
Reichenbach are representative of Positivistic scholarship and are technical but
readable.
Ayer, A. J. (Ed.) (1959). Logical
positivism.
Frank, P. (1957). Philosophy of
science.
Reichenbach, H. (1956). The rise of
scientific philosophy.
B. The decline of the standard
view.
The doctrines of logical positivism and
the modified American version called logical empiricism are frequently referred
to as "the standard view" in the literature. Brown documents the claim for a
"Kuhnian" type of revolution in philosophy of science that replaced the standard
view. Brown's book contains a superb account of the attributes and decline of
positivism and its replacement by paradigm theory. If you are able to squeeze in
the four chapters from Brown, you might find them quite rewarding.
Brown, H. I. (1979). Perception,
theory, and commitment: The new philosophy of science. Chicago,
The standard view faltered on a number of
problems: An issue of considerable importance was the possibility of
establishing a theory-free and presupposition-free "objective" observational set
of facts or data base. This is referred to, in some contexts, as the categorical
dichotomy between theoretical and observational terms. The position that is now
generally accepted is that scientific observation cannot be completely separated
from analysis and presupposition. A second critical issue concerned the
possibility of crucial experiments or any other methodological device that
would, once and for all, establish the truth of scientific theories and laws.
Kaplan, Abraham. (1964). The conduct of inquiry.
Chapter 3, pp 84-1
Duhem,
Part II, Chapter
5. Physical law, pp.
165-179,
Chap 4, In particular, pp.
144-147.
The next two papers are recent efforts to
develop the theory of observation
in science and to reformulate the observation - theory distinction on more
principled grounds. If you wish to know the direction this issue is taking read
the next two papers.
Shapere, D. (198
Fodor, J.A. (1984). Observation
reconsidered. Philosophy of Science, 51,
The brief paper by Copi makes a very
important point that you may have missed in the Duhem chapter above. Copi, in
less than four pages destroys the doctrine of crucial experiments. The
conclusion has to be that most scientific knowledge is
fallible.
Copi, I.M. A. (1960). Crucial
experiments, pp
Part 4: PARADIGM
THEORY
A. Views of scientific presuppositional
systems appearing about the same time as Kuhn's classic
book.
Polanyi, Michael.
A. (1964). Personal knowledge.
See especially: pp. 160-171, 104 ff.,
Toulmin, Stephen. A. (1963). Foresight
and understanding.
B. Paradigms, normal science, and
paradigm shifts.
T. S. Kuhn: Kuhn's original views on
scientific progression held that a discipline starts in a preparadigmatic state
with several different schools or orientations in conflict. One of the schools
becomes the dominant paradigm of the field ushering in a period of normal
science. Anomalies and failures give rise to a series crises. When conditions
are right a new challenging paradigm arises with a resulting clash between the dominant and rising
paradigm. If the ensuing revolution is successful, the new paradigm becomes
dominant.
Look for and read the
general principles, scan illustrations and
historical examples. Don't forget to examine the Postscript, dated
1969.
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of
scientific revolutions.
You must consider that many of the
specific details of Kuhn's original analysis are incorrect. He presented major
changes and qualifications in the postscript to the second edition. However, his
book is a classic and his emphasis on the centrality of paradigms is of major
importance. In this context, I mean by paradigm: A scientific community with
a common technical language, similar research problems and methods, a common
data base, and a common view of reality as it is reflected in and reflects the
subject matter. All of these
commonalties are partial and reflect central tendencies. A "paradigm" does
not mean the dominance of an area by a single substantive scientific
theory nor an ideological or metaphysical comprehensive world view
().
C. Scientific paradigms--evolving
conceptions of what they are, how they work, and in what ways they differ from
related things.
Lakatos,
Barker, P. and Gholson, B. (1984). The
history of psychology as a rational process: Lakatos versus Kuhn. In Reese, H.
(Ed.). Advances in child development
and behavior.
Beilin, H. (1984). Functionalist and
structuralist research programs in developmental psychology: Incommensurability
or synthesis. In Reese, H. (Ed.). Advances in child development and
behavior.
I will cover Lakatos and Musgrave in
class. The Lakatos chapter is frequently cited but some students have found that
the effort to read it is oppressive and too time
consuming.
Kuhn, pp. 1-
Masterman, pp. 59-90. The nature of a
paradigm.
Lakatos, pp. 91-196. Falsification and
the methodology of science research
programs.
Kuhn, pp.
In the very extensive debate concerning
Kuhn's conceptions, several additional views should be examined or at least
noted. Shapere presents a strong critique of the paradigm concept but offers no
viable alternatives for dealing with the reality it represents. Scheffler
totally rejects the major segments of Kuhn's view including most attributes of
scientific revolutions and normal science. Kordig, in contrast, steers a middle
course between standard views of scientific change (i.e., logical empiricism)
and the Kuhnian account of conceptual revolutions in science. Stegmuller and
Brown have both made significant extensions and improvements of the Kuhnian
doctrine. Lachman et. al. show in Chap. 1 and 4 how a modified and reformulated
version of the doctrine can be meaningfully applied to psychology. The Brown and
Lachman et. al. books are of particular interest because they accept and analyze
gradual change and continuity while
still using the doctrine of revolutionary change. In their view, paradigmatic
change is not absolute but includes continuities and evolutionary changes. Some
of the lecture material on Kuhn can be found in Chap. 1
(L.L.B).
Shapere, D. (1971). Critique of the
paradigm concept. Science,
17
Scheffler, I.
(197
Kordig, C. R. (1971). The justification
of scientific change, Dordrect: D. Reidel,. (Short Version) Kordig, C. R. The comparability of scientific
theories. Philosophy of
Science, 1971, 38, 467-485.
Stegmuller, W. (1976) The structure
and dynamics of theories.
Brown, H. I. (1976). Perception,
theory, and commitment: The new philosophy of science.
Kuhn, T. S. (1977). The essential tension.
Preface IX-XXII.
Chap. 1
Chap. 13, Objectivity, value judgment, and theory
choice.
Lachman, R. and Lachman, J. L. (1979). A
significant step forward. Contemporary Psychology. 1979,
Part 5: 1965-1970 PARADIGM
SHIFT
A. Anomalies.
Segal, E. M. and Lachman, R.
(197
Weimer, W. B., and
Lachman, Lachman, and Butterfield.(1979).
Cognitive Psychology and Information Processing. LEA. Chapters 1, 4,
14.
Evolutionary presuppositions:
Lachman, J. L. and Lachman, R.
(1979).Theories of memory organization and human evolution. In C.R.
Puff (Ed.), Memory organization and structure.
B. Criticisms of contemporary
psychological practices.
Koch's criticism of
Koch, S. (1973). Theory and experiment in
psychology. Social Research, 691-707.
Koch, S. (1974). Psychology as a science.
In S. C. Brown (Ed.), Philosophy of psychology. Harper and Row.
Koch, S. (1981). The nature and limits of
psychological knowledge.
American Psychologist, 36,
Koch, S. and Leary, D.E.(1985) A
century of psychology as science.
The papers above show considerable
overlap, so reading the any article paper should help you get a handle on Koch's
thinking which is nihilistic and devastating, but includes many valid points.
Read the review below to put Koch's views into a more appropriate
perspective.
Lachman, R. and Mistler-Lachman, J. L.
(1976). The scientists' viability. Contemporary Psychology,
B. Balanced
criticism.
Weimer is very tough reading but I think
his view of deficiencies in the field is much more balanced than Koch's. If you
want to try this book, it will require a heavy investment of time
.
Weimer, W. B.
(1979). Notes on the
methodology of scientific research. Hillsdale, N. J.: LEA.
There are few articles that propose real
solutions to the problem of the discipline's disunity and related difficulties.
You might want to look at Staats, read Bevan.
Bevin, W. (198
Staats, A. W. (1981). Paradigmatic
behaviorism, unified theory, unified theory construction methods, and the
zeitgeist of separatism. American Psychologist, 136,
Part 6: AFTERMATH OF THE PARADIGM
SHIFT
A. Learning Theory.
Learning theory was central to the
dominant paradigm of 1940-1970. If learning theory is important to your
professional goals, read the entire
Johnston, T. D.(1981). Contrasting
approaches to a theory of learning. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
4, 1
Read pages 1
Lachman, J. L. and Lachman, R.
(1981). General process theory,
ecology, and animal-human continuity: A cognitive perspective. The Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 4, 149-150.
B. Two Noble
prizes.
Here are some more results of the 1970s
paradigm shift: Sperry's Nobel prize lectures and our review of Simon's Nobel
prize work.
Sperry, R. (198
Lachman, R. and Lachman, J. L.(1981).
Thinking at its best. Contemporary Psychology, 1981b,
C. Paradigms and
presuppositions.
The following assignment is the most
current publication on paradigms and presuppositions as they affect various
areas of psychology. I hope you are now at point where you can read it with a
self-confident but critical attitude.
Lachman, R. and Lachman, J. L. (1986).
Information processing psychology: Origins and extensions. In R. E. Ingram
(Ed.), Information processing approaches to psychopathology and clinical
psychology.
D. The human
sciences.
Secord, P. (1990). The need for a
radically new human science. In D. N. Robinson and L. P. Mos (Eds.), Annals
of theoretical psychology, Vol. 6.
Polkinghorne, D. (1983). Methodology
for the human sciences: Systems of Inquiry.
E. Radical
Behaviorism.
The following two readings are a debate
on the efficacy of the presupposition of radical (Skinnerian)
behaviorism.
Zuriff, G. E. (1986). Precise of
Behaviorism: A conceptual reconstruction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
9, 687-699.
Lachman, R. (1988). Behaviorism:
Counterarguments are pointless. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
11,
Part 7: PARADIGMS AND THEORETICAL
EXPLANATION IN PSYCHOLOGY
A. Explanation.
Kendler's Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate the
variety of explanations that are acceptable to various subgroups in
psychology.
Kendler, H. H.(1981). Psychology: A science in
conflict.
The next reading is strongly especially
for students in the developmental program. Feldman, C. F., and Toulmin, S. E.
(1975). Theoretical problems in structural psychology. In, Arnold, W. S. (Ed.),
The following book is recommended; it
covers some of the same ground as Kendler but is written by a logician. Cummins
believes that the deductive- nomological model of explanation is inadequate for
psychology. He argues that some of the most important phenomena of psychology
can only be explained in terms of system dispositional properties (what the
relevant parts of the system are and how they work
together).
Cummins, R. (1983). The nature of
psychological explanation.
B. Paradigm Theory and Psychology.
Several new papers have recently appeared in the literature regarding paradigm
theory in psychology.
Suppe, F. Beyond Skinner and Kuhn.
(1984). New Ideas in Psychology,
Weimer, W. B.
(1984). Beyond Suppe in methodology. New Ideas
in Psychology,
Part 7: EMERGING POSITIONS IN PSYCHOLOGY,
SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Paradigm theory, in
the Kuhnian version or some variation, is now the dominant theory of science.
Even its most strident critics
accept many of its sociological tenets and the concept of periodic revolutionary
change. It would seem appropriate for research to move on to other unresolved
problems in the foundations of science such as the following. What is the
relationship between the often changing epistemic (knowledge) products of
science and ultimate physical and psychological reality, both of which must possess certain fixed or
stable parameters? How is scientific inquiry going to deal in a meaningful and
effective way with complex, open systems such as those faced by psychologists?
How can volitional human decision and conscious choice be incorporated into
causal laws of nature or how are the latter to be reformulated? The following
article and associated commentary start to address these and other
issues.
Manicas, P.T. and Secord, P.F. (1983).
Implications for psychology of the new philosophy of science. American
Psychologist, 38, 399-413.
Comments on the Manicas and Secord paper.
(1984). American Psychologist,
August.
The chapter by Rom Harre also deals with
a realist philosophy of science for psychology with comments on Bhaskar's
approach but it is much easier to read than Manicus and Secord. -- Giere argues
for a "naturalized" philosophy of science and a unified theory of
science.
Harre, R. (1981). The
positivist-empiricist approach and its alternative. In Reason, P. and Rowan, J.
(Eds.) Human Inquiry.
Giere, R. N. (1984). Toward a unified
theory of science. In Cushing, J. T., Delaney, C. F., and Gutting, G. M.
Science and Reality. Notre Dame, IN:
Giere, R.N. (1985). Philosophy of science
naturalized. Philosophy of Science, 5
Part 8: ANOMALIES AND REVOLUTIONARY
SCIENCE: CONNECTIONISM
Lachman, R. (1984). Innovative thinking
about the fields of psychology. Contemporary Psychology,
933-934.
Miller, G. A. (1986). Dismembering
cognition. In S. H. Hulse and B. F. Green, Jr. (Eds.) 100 years of
psychological research in
CONNECTIONISM, AND COGNITIVE
SCIENCE.
Palmer, S. (1987). A new paradigm for
cognitive theory. Contemporary Psychology. 3
Churchland, P. M. (1990). Cognitive
activity in artificial neural networks. In Osherson, D. N. and
Smith, E. E. (Eds.), Thinking Vol. 3.
Churchland's chapter is the best
introductory level account of Connectionism (also called PDP - parallel distributed
processing).
Holyoak, K. J. A connectionist view of
cognition. Science.
Schwartz, J. T. (1988). The new
connectionism: Developing relationships between neuroscience and artificial
intelligence. Daedalus. 1
Simon, H. A. and Kaplan, C. A. (1989).
Foundations of cognitive science. In Posner, M. A. (Ed.), The
foundations of cognitive science.
Herb Simon's chapter is the best (quasi
technical) overview of Cognitive Science.
Edelman, G. M. (199
PART 11:
MULTIPLE PARADIGMS and FORMALISM-1:
CONNECTIONIST and PRODUCTION SYSTEM MODELS; EXPERT SYSTEMS
PART 1
POST-MODERNISM, SCIENCE AND
ANTI-SCIENCE: The following
references represent the issues
discussed in some of the final lectures.
Bevan, W. and Kessel, F. (1994). Plain
Truths and home cooking: Thoughts on the remaking of psychology. American
Psychologist, 505-509.
Holton, G. (1993). Science and anti
science.
Medwawar, P. B. (1990). The threat and the glory: Reflections on
science and scientists.